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Abstract 
Since 1997, the Department of Defense (DoD) has shown increasing interest 
in using reverse auctions, particularly electronic reverse auctions, to purchase a 
wide range of products and services.  The research describes DoD’s experience 
with acquisition auctions, identifying the characteristics of the buyers, sellers, and 
the products/services exchanged through auctions.  In general, reverse auctions 
have been limited to procurement actions involving relatively standard price-driven 
commercial products—products typically purchased through traditional competitive 
markets.  It appears that DoD has substituted reverse auctions for the market 
research required in the standard DoD procurement processes; the auction service 
providers are replacing federal procurement agents in advertising the procurement 
action and soliciting bids from competing suppliers. 
Drawing on this background, this research examines auction mechanism(s) 
that appear appropriate for the defense acquisition environment.  Two specific 
auction designs are explored.  The first is a two-stage Iterated Information 
Aggregation Auction (I2A2) involving multiple product characteristics—including 
price—that are specified as part of the auction bidding process.  In the I2A2, the first 
stage acts as market research for gathering information dispersed across the 
decentralized contractor base to establish characteristic weights to evaluate 
proposals in the second stage.  The research showed significant potential 
performance improvements when decentralized trade-off information is centralized 
through the I2A2 mechanism.   
The second auction mechanism involves situations where the quality of fit 
between the buyer and seller affect the transaction’s value (e.g., synergy between 
an author and an editor, etc.).  This analysis explores the impact of asymmetric 
information on the mechanism’s design.  The research developed optimal 
mechanisms for transactions where both parties know the quality of fit and 
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The economy has developed several mechanisms to govern the interactions 
between buyers and sellers.1  Traditional markets are most effective when there are 
many potential buyers and sellers and when products are relatively standardized.  In 
traditional markets, competition between both buyers and sellers ensures that the 
market establishes an efficient price to balance supply and demand.  Bargaining 
generally characterizes situations where markets are thin and there are few buyers and 
sellers.  Forward auctions are increasingly used in cases in which there is only one 
seller and several buyers.  This trend is evident with the explosion of online auctions, 











The Department of Defense (DoD) participates in transactions that involve 
several of these situations.  As a consumer of specialized defense products, DoD 
operates as single buyer with any where from a single to several potential suppliers, 
depending on the uniqueness of the defense product.  As a consumer of standard 
commercial commodities, such as pencils and paper, it participates in markets with 
many buyers and sellers, though the size of defense purchases often makes DoD an 
atypical consumer in these markets.  As a result, DoD should be expected to exploit the 
                                            
1 A mechanism is the set of rules that govern the interactions between parties in a relationship; in this 
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full range of transaction mechanisms, from standard market interactions to auctions and 
bargaining. 
Historically, the DoD acquisition process, and the federal government in general, 
emphasize market transactions and bargaining.  The federal government has developed 
a specialized set of rules to govern these interactions (the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations or the FAR); DoD has added its own set of rules to adapt the FAR to 
Defense applications (the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement, or the DFARs). 
Since 1997, DoD has shown increasing interest in using auctions to exploit the 
full range of transaction mechanisms.  Prior to 1997, auctions were largely precluded by 
the FAR; however, the 1997 FAR rewrite removed wording that prohibited auctions.  As 
discussed below, procurement officials now view the FAR as supporting federal 
procurement auctions.  As a result, reverse auctions, particularly electronic reverse 
auctions, have been expanding in use across the federal government and DoD.  
Several providers offer electronic reverse auction (e-RA) services and many responded 
to requests for information for this research.  However, only two providers contributed 
detailed data:  FedBid, Inc. (FedBid), and the US Army Auction and Valuation Engine 
(USAAVE).  USAAVE was developed by MOAI CompleteSource and is used by the 
Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) Acquisition Center.2 
Given the transaction mechanism hierarchy described above, defense acquisition 
auction applications should typically involve DoD as a single buyer facing several 
potential sellers through a reverse auction.  Atypically, many early DoD acquisition 
auctions involved more standard commercial products and services with several 
competing sellers.  For example, information technology equipment, software and 
supplies represented approximately 50% of the auctions between FY2002 and FY2007, 
                                            
2 FedBid and USAAVE data was gathered by Whitney Brown, Capt., USAF and Lana Ray, Capt., USAF 
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in terms of both value and number of auctions, as conducted by FedBid, a large 
defense electronic auction house.3  These early defense auction applications involve 
relatively straightforward auction designs and were credited with significant DoD cost 
savings (FedBid estimates 8.8% savings for DoD and 14.4% savings for the rest of the 
federal government between FY2002 and FY2007; USAAVE, another defense 
electronic auction house, estimates 31.6% savings between FY2000 and FY20074). 
Commensurate with the explosion of auctions in practice, there has been an 
explosion in theoretical and experimental work on auctions.  As a result, there is a broad 
base of auction mechanisms from which to choose; auction mechanism design is 
increasingly tailored to the specific situation at hand.  Some important design 
characteristics include the number of sellers, the number of items being purchased, the 
number of items that can be purchased from each seller, the number of markets 
(auctions) in which sellers simultaneously participate, etc.  The more standard auction 
theory does not address these more stylized circumstances. 
Based on developments of auction theory, it is important to consider how 
auctions have been, or could be, applied to defense acquisition.  In considering this 
application, imperfect and asymmetric information are pervasive themes across all of 
DoD’s transactions.  Asymmetric information might take several forms:  imperfect 
information about potential sellers’ prices or costs; imperfect information about product 
quality or even DoD’s optimal level of quality, if the trade-offs between cost, 
performance and schedule are unclear ex ante; and uncertainty about the quality of the 
fit between DoD and the supplier, where the fit between buyer and seller significantly 
affects the transaction’s value.  This research will address how DoD might tailor its 
interaction with contractors to exploit auction design and address information 
asymmetries. 
                                            
3 Brown and Ray (2007), Appendix C. 
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This research considers three related issues, as appropriate.  The research will 
begin by describing the Defense Department’s experience with acquisition auctions, 
which will identify the characteristics of the buyers, sellers, and the products/services 
exchanged through auctions.  It will indicate the characteristics of the auction 
environment and whether auctions are being applied in the most appropriate instances. 
Drawing on past experience, the research will examine auction mechanism(s) 
that appear appropriate for the defense acquisition environment.  Two specific auction 
designs will be explored.  The first is a two-stage Iterated Information Aggregation 
Auction (I2A2) involving multiple product characteristics—including price—that are 
specified as part of the auction bidding process.  In the I2A2, the first stage acts as 
market research or gathering information dispersed across the decentralized contractor 
base to establish characteristic weights to evaluate proposals in the second stage.  The 
second auction mechanism involves situations where the quality of fit between the 
buyer and seller affect the transaction’s value (e.g., synergy between an author and an 
editor, a mentor and a protégé, etc.).  This analysis will explore the impact of 
asymmetric information on the mechanism’s design, including situations in which both 
parties are fully informed about the quality of the match and situations in which only the 
buyer (seller) has perfect information.  Finally, the research will develop simulation 
evidence demonstrating how the auction mechanisms perform in the defense 
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II. Auction Theory 
A. Auction Characteristics 
As mentioned above, auctions are an appropriate mechanism to set prices in 
market transactions when there is either a single seller and several buyers (forward 
auction) or a single buyer and several sellers (reverse auction).  Within these two broad 
categories, potential auction designs can be further sub-divided into open/sequential bid 
auctions and sealed/simultaneous bid auctions.  In open/sequential bid auctions, 
bidders or their agents are present during the auction—either physically or virtually—to 
monitor the auction’s progress and bid as appropriate.  Bidders in sealed/simultaneous 
auctions need not be present during the auction; instead, they submit bids prior to the 
auction and all bids are opened simultaneously.5 
Forward Reverse
Open / Sequential Bid






Figure 1.  Alternative Auction Structures 
In an English auction, bidders successively call out bids, which either raise the 
current price in a forward auction or lower the price in a reverse auction.  Bidders 
remain in the auction until the current price surpasses their value, at which point they 
                                            
5 For a more detailed description of auction types see Brown and Ray (2007), chapter II.  For a general 
discussion of auction theory see Campbell (2006), Kambil and vanHeck (2002), Klemperer (2002), 
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voluntarily drop out.  The auction continues until only one bidder remains (the highest 
bidder in a forward auction and the lowest bidder in a reverse auction).  The last bidder 
wins the auction at a price equal to the value of the last excluded bidder (the second 
highest value in a forward auction and the second lowest value in a reverse auction).  
The English auction is the most commonly envisioned auction mechanism and is used 
routinely by many private auction houses to sell antiques, artwork, etc. 
In a Dutch auction, the price starts at a price well in excess of the expected 
closing price (high in a forward auction and low in a reverse auction).  The auctioneer 
then adjusts the price until a bidder signals a willingness to accept.  Dutch auctions 
have been used in Holland to sell tulips, amongst other things.  The item is awarded to 
the first bidder at the price bid. 
As mentioned above, bidders submit their bids prior to the auction in a 
sealed/simultaneous bid auction.  These bids are sealed (i.e., private and unknown to 
other bidders).  The bids are opened simultaneously and the winner is determined 
(highest bid in a forward auction and lowest bid in a reverse auction).  In a first-price 
sealed-bid auction, the final price is determined by the winning bid (the winner 
pays/receives what it bid).  In a second-price sealed-bid (Vickery) auction, the price is 
determined by the first excluded bid (the second highest bid in a forward auction and 
the second lowest bid in a reverse auction) (Vickery, 1961).  First-price sealed-bid 
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B. Bidding Strategies 
Table 1.  Auction Bidding Strategies and Outcomes  
Highest Bidder 
Wins at 2nd PriceBid True Value
Second-Price 
Sealed-Bid











Wins at 2nd PriceBid Up to True ValueEnglish
OutcomeStrategyAuction
 
Different auction mechanisms elicit different bidding behavior and potentially 
different auction outcomes.  The bidding strategy in the English auction is 
straightforward:  continue bidding as long as the current price provides a positive 
surplus value (profit); drop out of the bidding once the price no longer provides a 
positive surplus value.  As such, the highest-valued bidder will win a forward English 
auction at a price equal to the second-highest bidder (equivalently, the lowest-priced 
supplier would win a reverse English auction at the price of the second-lowest-priced 
supplier). 
The optimal bidding strategy in a second-price sealed-bid is also straightforward:  
always bid your true value.  There is no potential gain from bidding either above or 
below your true value, but there is a potential loss.  Consider a forward auction in which 
my expected value for the item being sold is $100.  Recall I pay the second-highest bid 
(first-excluded bid) if I win this auction.  Suppose I bid $110 and the second-highest bid 
is $90.  I would win the auction and pay $90; my surplus (profit) is $10.  However, I 
would still win and earn the same surplus if I bid $100.  Alternatively, suppose I bid $110 
and the second-highest bid is $105.  I would win the auction but pay $105, losing $5.  I 
would not win this auction if I bid $100.  In other words, there is no gain from 
overbidding in auctions that provide a positive surplus; however, overbidding can lead to 
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The argument against underbidding is similar.  Suppose I bid $90 and the 
second-highest bid is $80.  I would win the auction and pay $80, earning a $20 surplus.  
However, I would still win and earn the same surplus if I bid $100.  Alternatively, 
suppose I bid $90 and the winning bid is $95.  I lose the auction and forego a potential 
$5 surplus; I would win the auction and earn the $5 surplus if I had bid $100.  Thus, 
there is no gain from underbidding.  Underbidding does not increase my surplus if I win 
the auction, but it may preclude me from winning an auction that would provide a 
positive surplus. 
With a dominant strategy of truthfully revealing actual value, a second-price 
sealed-bid auction has the same expected outcome as an English auction:  the auction 
is won by the bidder with the highest (lowest) value in a forward (reverse) auction at a 
price equal to the first-excluded bid—the second -highest (lowest) price in a forward 
(reverse) auction.  In theory, these two auction structures are equivalent. 
The optimal bidding strategies are a bit more complicated in Dutch and first-price 
sealed-bid auctions.  When participants submit their bids in these auction formats, they 
do not have any information about the bids submitted by other participants.  
Furthermore, their bid determines both their probability of winning and their surplus 
(profit) if they win.  As a result, bidders face a trade-off between risk and return in 
selecting their bids.  In a first-price sealed-bid auction, I maximize my probability of 
winning an auction by bidding my actual value, but that sacrifices all surplus value.  As I 
adjust my bid to increase my surplus, I reduce my probability of winning.  If I am neutral 
in my risk preferences (neither avoid nor seek out risk), I will select the bid that 
maximizes my expected surplus value.  In a forward (reverse) auction, this strategy 
involves shading my bid below (above) my actual value.  If I am risk averse, I will bid 
closer to my true value to reduce my risk (but sacrificing my expected surplus—I am 
paying to reduce risk). 
The Dutch auction is equivalent to the first-price sealed-bid auction.  As the price 
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accept the price as soon as it equals my true value; however, that sacrifices all surplus 
value.  If I let the price continue to fall, it increases my surplus but decreases my 
probability of winning (increases the probability someone else will bid to accept the 
current price).  If risk-neutral, I want to bid when the auction reaches the price that 
maximizes my expected surplus value.  As above, this involves shading my bid below 
(above) my actual value in a forward (reverse) auction. 
The revenue equivalence theorem demonstrates that all four auction designs 
have the same expected price (seller revenue) with risk-neutral bidders and a few other 
typically applicable characteristics (many bidders who all have the same distribution of 
potential values, individual values that are independent across participants, and 
payments that are a function of bids alone).  To motivate revenue equivalence while 
avoiding a formal mathematical proof, suppose all bidders are risk neutral and fully 
informed about everyone’s true value.  How would I bid in a forward first-price sealed-
bid or Dutch auction.  If I were the highest valued bidder, I would bid a price equal to the 
second-highest value; the auction would have the same outcome as an English or 
second-price sealed-bid auction.  No one else could outbid me without losing money. 
What if I do not have perfect information about the other bidders’ values?  If I 
think I am the highest valued bidder, my goal is to guess the second-highest value and 
set my bid equal to this estimate (I might allow for some margin of error if I am risk 
averse).  If bidders guess on average, and there is no reason to expect rational bidders 
to systematically over- or under-estimate the range of values, then all auctions are 
revenue equivalent on average.  This outcome is the basis for claiming revenue 
equivalence.   
C. Additional Auction Mechanisms 
There are several additional auction designs that have evolved to address more 
unique situations.  A few will be mentioned briefly here, including multi-item auctions, 
multi-attribute auctions, combinatorial auctions, and hybrid auctions.  Multi-item auctions 
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These auctions can determine a single price for all transactions or different prices for 
each transaction.  Multi-attribute auctions typically involve transactions in which the 
buyer is interested in several attributes of the item being sold.  For example, a federal 
auction for spare parts might include attributes such as price, delivery schedule and 
technical quality.  Different bids would involve different combinations of these attributes 
and the government would determine the preferred bid by weighting the attributes 
according to the government’s preferences.  Combinatorial auctions are typically the 
mirror image to multi-attribute auctions; they are forward auctions in which buyers offer 
monetary bids for items that have multi-dimensional characteristics.   
Finally, there are a variety of hybrid auctions.  One hybrid of interest, used in 
many electronic auction sites, such as E-Bay, is the English auction with proxy bidding.  
Proxy bidding allows participants to specify the maximum they are will to pay for the 
item in question.  For example, suppose I am willing to pay up to $100 for an item being 
auctioned; the current price is $40 and the minimum bid increment is $2.  With proxy 
bidding, I would specify $100 as my maximum bid.  This maximum is private 
information.  Proxy bidding would enter my bid as $42 (the current price plus the 
minimum bid increment).  If another bidder enters the auction and raises the bid to $50, 
my proxy bid would automatically increase to $52.  This would continue until either I win 
the auction or the winning price exceeds $100 (I do have the option to increase my 
proxy bid). 
Proxy bidding essentially converts a familiar auction format, the English auction, 
into a less familiar format, the second-price sealed-bid auction.  With this type of proxy 
bidding, the optimal strategy is to specify my true value, just as in a second-price 
sealed-bid auction. 
In addition to the general structure of the auction mechanism design, there are 
several design characteristics that influence an auction’s performance.  Some of these 
features include reserve prices/minimum bids, minimum bid increments, entry fees, 
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a brief introduction to these characteristics, as well as others.  It is important to note that 
these characteristics can affect an auction’s performance, and they are important to 
consider in determining an optimal auction design.  However, detailed discussion of 
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III. Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government 
A. Federal Regulations Affecting Procurement Auctions 
If auctions are to be used in the federal procurement process, they must satisfy 
all the relevant federal rules and regulations.  This discussion, adapted from Brown and 
Ray (2007, Chapter 3), briefly summarizes the relevant rules and regulations. 
1. Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement 
The primary documents regulating the defense acquisition process are the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS).  The FAR is the general guidance covering all federal 
acquisitions; the DFARS is one of several supplements that specifically tailors the 
federal policies to the defense sector, typically imposing additional restrictions and 
requirements. 
The FAR specifically prohibited auctions prior to 1997; in particular, FAR Part 
15,610(e)(2) prohibited: 
Auction techniques such as— 
Indicating to an offeror a cost that it must meet to obtain further consideration; 
Advising an offeror of its price standing relative to another offeror (however it is 
permissible to inform and offer that its cost or price is considered by the 
Government to be too high or unrealistic); and otherwise furnishing information 
about other offerors’ prices. 
However, this language was eliminated in 1997, and now FAR Part 1.102 (d) and FAR 
Part 4.502 (a) are considered to authorize federal procurement auctions.  These FAR 
sections state: 
FAR 1.102 (d): In exercising initiative, Government members of the Acquisition 
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best interests of the Government and is not addressed in the FAR, nor prohibited 
by law (statute or case law), Executive order or other regulation, that the 
strategy, practice, policy or procedure is a permissible exercise of authority. 
FAR 4.502 (a): The Federal Government shall use electronic commerce 
whenever practicable or cost-effective. 
2. Buy American Act 
The Buy American Act (BAA) restricts the purchase of foreign-produced end-
products.  While e-RA may facilitate participation by foreign suppliers, the BAA 
restrictions still apply.  The BAA provision and clause are included in all solicitations and 
contracts, and the contractor will be held responsible for any violations.  Similarly, the 
contracting officers must do their part to ensure the products procured through federal 
auctions adhere to the Buy American Act.  
3. Procurement Integrity Act 
The Procurement Integrity Act prohibits disclosure of one contractor’s proposal 
information to other competitors.  FAR 15.306(e)(3) similarly stipulates that the 
government may not “reveal an offeror’s price without that offeror’s permission.”  This 
would seemingly preclude reverse English auctions, or any other auction mechanism 
that publicizes the participants’ bids.  Typically this is resolved by including language in 
the solicitation stating that participation implies consent to reveal anonymous price data, 
though there is some debate about whether participation can imply consent. 
4. Socio-Economic Concerns:  Small and Disadvantaged Businesses 
Congress believes that “the security and well-being [of the nation] cannot be 
realized unless the actual and potential capacity of small businesses is encouraged and 
developed” (15 USC 631, 2006).  To promote small businesses in the federal 
procurement process, the Small Business Act, Armed Services Procurement Act, 
Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, section 7102 of the Federal 
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incorporate guidance regarding the use of small and disadvantaged businesses (FAR 
19.000). 
Accomplishing this objective requires contracting officials to seek qualified small 
businesses and involve them in the procurement process.  This is accomplished 
through a variety of outreach mechanisms to identify interested businesses, inform them 
about procurement opportunities and help them navigate the federal procurement 
regulations and procedures.  It is also supported by dividing larger procurement lots into 
sizes more consistent with small business capabilities (which is authorized by FAR 
19.202-19(a)). 
To further support this objective, FAR 19.5—Set Asides for Small Business—
mandates that all requirements for supplies and services between $3,000 and $100,000 
be designated specifically for small businesses as long as there is a reasonable 
expectation of two or more responsible small businesses.  This is further applied to 
requirements for services and supplies over $100,000, again assuming a reasonable 
expectation of two or more responsible small businesses. 
Electronic reverse auctions are compatible with these objectives as long as small 
businesses have the technology and knowledge required to participate.  The required 
technology includes access to a computer and to the Internet.  This technology is 
already required to participate in the traditional federal procurement process; DFARS 
252.232-7003, Electronic Submission of Payment Requests—March 2007, requires all 
contractors to submit their invoices electronically, via one of several Internet/web-based 
invoicing systems. 
The expertise to participate in an electronic reverse auction is available to both 
contractors and contracting officers through a Defense Acquisition University continuous 
learning module (CLC 031:  Reverse Auctions); a 22-page electronic General Services 
Administration (GSA) Reverse Auction User’s Guide (GSA 2002), and Internet 
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(CECOM, n.d.), the US Navy’s Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP, n.d.), The US Air 
Force (2006) and several other federal agencies.  Reverse auction service providers, 
such as FedBid, also provide training. 
In many respects, e-RA may facilitate small business participation.  For example, 
when a procurement request is designated as a small business—service-disabled 
veteran-owned or other set-aside—Fedbid focuses its solicitation on the relevant 
category of businesses, sending the solicitation to every registered vendor in that 
industry, thereby satisfying the set-aside requirements.  FebBid will also seek additional 
qualified vendors if there are insufficient responses to the solicitation (FedBid, 2007b). 
In general, e-RAs have been well received.  There have been some complaints 
that auctions drive prices below those negotiated in Basic Purchasing agreements 
(BPAs) or Government-wide Acquisition Contracts, and some argue that the final 
auction prices are too low to provide a reasonable small business profit (Stever, 2007).  
However, as indicated in the auction theory section, complaints about excessively low 
prices should be expected for all but the winning bidder.  If the price was still attractive 
to multiple vendors, they would have continued bidding.  On balance, vendors have 
accepted e-RAs.  Only three protests have been filed with GAO to date and none were 
resolved in the vendor’s favor6  (GAO 2005; GAO, 2001a, GAO, 2001b). 
B. Electronic Reverse Auctions:  Defense Department and 
Other Federal Agencies 
As mentioned above, several providers offer electronic reverse auction (e-RA) 
services.  Two providers were able to supply detailed data for this research:  FedBid, 
Inc. (FedBid) and the US Army Auction and Valuation Engine (USAAVE).7  This data 
                                            
6 For more detailed discussion of these protests, see Brown and Ray (2007, Chapter 3). 
7 FedBid and USAAVE data was gathered by Whitney Brown, Capt., USAF and Lana Ray, Capt., USAF 
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shows the volume of transactions completed through electronic reverse auctions.  Table 
2 summarizes the auctions conducted by FedBid over the period FY2002—FY2007 and 
by USAAVE over the period FY2000 and FY2007 (Brown and Ray, 2007, Appendix B). 
The FedBid and USAAVE data summarized in Table 2 also estimated the 
savings attributable to the e-RA procurement process.  In both cases, FedBid and 
USAAVE estimated their savings by comparing the actual contract price to the ex ante 
independent government cost estimate.  Using this benchmark, the savings attributed to 
e-RAs are significant: 12.7% overall for FedBid, including 8.8% for DoD procurements 
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Table 2. FedBid and USAAVE Auction Results 














FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18,401 $1,187,932,046 $1,037,440,499 $150,491,548 12.70%
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 5,932 $351,179,597 $320,444,507 $30,735,089 8.80%
Department of the Army 3,101 $146,222,796 $132,698,678 $13,524,119 9.20%
Department of the Air Force 316 $58,553,765 $53,909,867 $4,643,898 7.90%
Department of the Navy 1,710 $70,127,231 $63,805,400 $6,321,831 9.00%
Other DoD Agencies 805 $76,275,804 $70,030,563 $6,245,241 8.20%
CIVILIAN AGENCIES   12,166 $829,655,257 $710,525,334 $119,129,923 14.40%
Department of Commerce 612 $48,030,428 $43,332,910 $4,697,519 9.80%
Department of Homeland Security 1,251 $253,431,462 $204,639,316 $48,792,146 19.30%
Department of Human Health 
Services 213 $46,662,044 $36,555,135 $10,106,908 21.70%
Department of Interior 18 $340,395 $302,297 $38,099 11.20%
Department of Justice 255 $32,715,574 $27,678,009 $5,037,565 15.40%
Department of State 7,747 $385,240,840 $342,732,342 $42,508,498 11.00%
Department of the Treasury 570 $11,704,722 $9,552,478 $2,152,243 18.40%
Department of Transportation 52 $2,802,799 $2,584,612 $218,188 7.80%
Department of Veteran Affairs 192 $4,377,255 $4,108,847 $268,408 6.10%
Environment Protection Agency 631 $9,389,259 $8,643,728 $745,532 7.90%
General Services Administration 111 $8,122,875 $6,057,461 $2,065,414 25.40%
Independent Agencies/Government 
Corporations 227 $16,360,791 $15,049,029 $1,311,761 8.00%
Other Civilian Agencies 111 $5,669,301 $5,301,894 $367,407 6.50%
Social Security Administration 176 $4,807,512 $3,987,276 $820,235 17.10%
CECOM 188 $153,865,877 $105,214,195 $48,651,682 31.62%
FedBid Cost Savings by Federal Agency (FY2002 - FY2007)
USAAVE Auctions (FY2000 - FY2007)
 
 
Of equal interest to the volume of transactions and projected cost savings is the 
type of commodities and services purchased using e-RAs.  For the most part, e-RAs 
involved relatively standard commercial products and services, in which vendor 
selection is primarily price-driven.  Commercial products include computer software and 
hardware, office supplies, field warfare supplies (tents, batteries, flashlights, flak vests), 
trailers, refrigerators, dishwashers, and plasma televisions.  Commercial services 
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services related to commodity purchases (installation services).  For a complete list of 
commodities and services, see Appendix A and B, reproduced here from Brown and 
Ray (2007).  As discussed above, standard commercial products and services are not 
the traditional product domain for reverse auctions.  Reverse auctions traditionally target 
products with one buyer and several sellers; DoD is only one of many buyers for most of 
these commercial products and services, albeit a large buyer in at least some cases. 
In addition to the cost savings estimates summarized above, e-RAs have been 
credited with several additional benefits—both price and efficiency related.  In particular, 
e-RA cost-related benefits focus on improving transparency by increasing price visibility, 
providing a comprehensive audit trail (including the names and number of bidders, 
prices of their bids, the number of vendors contacted, and the number of vendors 
choosing not to bid), encouraging full and open competition and ensuring that prices are 
fair and reasonable.  Efficiency-related benefits involve time savings both for the 
government contracting officials and from reducing the procurement cycle-time required 
to go from solicitation to contractor selection. 
C. Reverse Auctions as a Market Research Pricing Tool 
In traditional procurement processes throughout the federal government, 
procurement offices follow FAR 7.102 guidelines requiring them to compete 
procurements to the maximum extent practicable.  This typically requires soliciting, but 
not necessarily obtaining, quotes from three to five vendors.  Time is generally the 
limiting factor because buyers have to manually gather a list of qualified vendors, call or 
e-mail those vendors to request quotes and then assimilate the results of the submitted 
quotes into a report before selecting the winner.  The small number of quotes obtained 
reflects the heavy workload and time needed to acquire and process the quotes. 
In the 2006 Hearing on Federal Contracting in Disaster Preparedness and 
Response House Committee on Government Reform, FedBid testified that it provides 
“direct access to over 400,000 sellers in the government’s seller database [the Central 
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each day during peak buying cycles, so the number of vendors contacted by a single 
buyer is quite large (FedBid, interview with W. Brown and L. Ray, September 19, 2007).  
Once a solicitation is posted with FedBid, it contacts the relevant vendors in its data 
base.  As a result, e-RAs can involve significantly more competitors than traditional 
procurement processes. 
Table 3 summarizes the average number of sellers that FedBid contacted per 
solicitation, the average number of sellers bidding per solicitation, and the average 
number of “no bids” per solicitation.  All three measures offer different competition 
metrics; in general, potential competition and contestability of markets is the critical 
dimension.  The average number of sellers bidding per solicitation is the most narrowly 
focused measure of competition.  These sellers are clearly active competitors.  The 
average number of sellers contacted is the broadest measure of competition; all of 
these sellers are potential competitors but their interest ranges from strong to none.  
The number of vendors who decided not to compete in that specific auction and 
responded with “no bid” provides an intermediate measure that reflects the number of 
sellers expressing interest in competing for the solicitation.  For comparison, Appendix 
B reports the number of vendors participating in the USAAVE auctions; on average, 
there were 5.09 vendors per solicitation in the 188 procurement actions. 
Table 3 and the USAAVE data in Appendix B highlight the advantages offered by 
e-RAs as they are currently implemented.  In targeting commercial price-driven products 
and services, e-RAs are replacing traditional market research and expanding 
competition by tapping into a much larger pool of potential competitors.  Increasing 
competition has two reinforcing effects.  If prices are distributed probabilistically across 
potential suppliers, increasing competition gives DoD more draws from the distribution, 
increasing DoD’s chances of finding a lower-cost supplier.  In addition, potential 
suppliers will likely submit prices that are closer to their actual costs as competition 
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Table 3. FedBid Results 








Ave. No. of 
Bids per 
Auction 









FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18,401 5.9 13.6 44.6 836.5 $8,178.44 
             
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 5,932 
             
4.7             10.2             55.7  
      
1,012.9  $5,181.24 
Department of the Army 3,101 4.1 8.9 59.6 1048.2 $4,361.21 
Department of the Air Force 316 3.7 8.7 58.8 1027.7 $14,695.88 
Department of the Navy 1,710 5.7 11.9 48.3 971.5 $3,696.98 
Other DoD Agencies 805 4.8 12.1 55 958.8 $7,758.06 
CIVILIAN AGENCIES   12,166  
             
6.5             15.3             39.0  
         
738.9  $9,792.04 
Department of Commerce 612 6.8 18.6 41 744.3 $7,675.68 
Department of Homeland Security 1,251 5.9 14 35.5 628.2 $39,002.51 
Department of Human Health 
Services 213 3.9 8.3 63.9 1079.6 $47,450.27 
Department of Interior 18 8.8 21.2 42.3 728.5 $2,116.61 
Department of Justice 255 5.4 12.8 53.2 1078.2 $19,755.16 
Department of State 7,747 6.4 14.8 38.1 734.5 $5,487.09 
Department of the Treasury 570 7.2 19.9 22.1 440.5 $3,775.86 
Department of Transportation 52 14 36.3 54.7 995.2 $4,195.92 
Department of Veteran Affairs 192 5.2 11.2 44.7 832.9 $1,397.96 
Environment Protection Agency 631 8.5 17.7 36.7 721.8 $1,181.51 
General Services Administration 111 6.8 15.4 17.6 269.2 $18,607.33 
Independent Agencies / 
Government Corporations 227 6.7 14.8 100 1949.2 $5,778.68 
Other Civilian Agencies 111 6.3 16.1 12.6 179.8 $3,309.97 
Social Security Administration 176 6.6 18.5 44.8 737.3 $4,660.43 
 
For example, suppose DoD is purchasing an item that has a price variability 
between $100 and $500.  In particular, prices for potential suppliers are independently 
and uniformly randomly distributed between $100 and $500.  As the number of 
suppliers contacted increases, the expected cost for the low-cost contractor decreases.  
The expected cost for the low-cost supplier is $233.33 with two suppliers.  This falls to 
$200 with three suppliers, $150 with seven suppliers, $125 with 15 suppliers and $120 




















Expected Price for 
Low Cost Supplier
Expected Bid for 
Low Cost Supplier
 
Figure 2. Effect of Competition on Expected First-Price Auction Price 
However, the supplier will not reveal this price in their cost estimate.  Instead, as 
described above, suppliers will overstate their costs to increase their profits, but the 
degree to which they can overstate costs will be tempered by the level of competition 
present.  As competition increases, cost estimates will approach the supplier’s actual 
cost because the contractor does not want to risk losing the contract.  Figure 2 shows 
the expected profit maximizing bid for the low cost supplier as the number of competing 
suppliers increases.  This is the expected price bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction or 
other similar contractor selection process.  If there are two suppliers, the bid that 
maximizes expected profits for the low-cost supplier is $366.67 (recall cost is $233.33).  
This falls to $300 for three suppliers (cost $200), $200 for seven contractors (cost 
$150), $150 for 15 contractors (cost $125), and $140 for 19 contractors (cost $120). 
This example in Figure 2 illustrates the dual impact of increasing competition as 
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competing suppliers increases from three to seven in the situation described above.  
With three contractors, the government would pay a price of $300 ($200 cost and $100 
supplier surplus).  As competition increases to seven suppliers, the expected 
government price falls to $200; the expected low-cost estimate falls from $200 to $150 
as DoD receives quotes from more contractors and the low-cost contractor’s bid 
includes a smaller profit margin ($50 as opposed to $100 with three suppliers).  The 
33% decrease in price is evenly divided between lower actual cost and lower supplier 
surplus.  With 15 suppliers as opposed to 3, the government’s expected cost would fall 
from $300 to $150; expected cost would fall by $75 (from $200 to $125) and competition 
would reduce supplier surplus by $75, from $100 to $25. 
Note that this figure also illustrates the revenue equivalence theorem.  The upper 
line represents the expected cost for the second-lowest-cost supplier.  If DoD used 
either an English or second-price sealed-bid auction, this would represent the price paid 
to the winning (low-cost) contractor.  Under a first-price sealed-bid or Dutch auction, this 
line represents the expected profit maximizing bid for the low-cost contractor.  
Essentially, the low-cost contractor attempts to estimate cost for the second-lowest-cost 
contractor.  This upper line represents the government’s expected cost for all the 
standard auction mechanisms. 
D. Lessons Learned From Using Federal Reverse Auctions 
The theory describing reverse auctions characterizes them as an appropriate 
mechanism to address transactions when there is a single buyer and several sellers.  In 
contrast, DoD and federal experience with reverse auctions seems to emphasize 
transactions in which there are many sellers but the government is only one of many 
potential buyers of the product or service, including relatively standard price-driven 
commercial commodities and services.  In this use, DoD has substituted the reverse 
auction, and support from the auction provider, for the market research federal 
procurement agents conduct when DoD purchases these items through a more 
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The alleged cost-savings attributed to reverse auctions is calculated as the 
difference between the government’s independent cost estimate and the final price after 
the auction.   It is likely that these savings reflect an increase in competition from e-RAs.  
Competition has two effects:  it increases the number of cost estimates, which increases 
the probability of finding a lower cost estimate; it decreases the sellers’ surplus as 
competition encourages bids closer to actual costs.  Data from FedBid and USAAVE 
indicate that reverse auction significantly increases the number of suppliers actually 
bidding on a contract, compared to the traditional market research process.  Data from 
FedBid further emphasizes that potential competition might be significantly greater than 
this because a large number of suppliers are notified about the solicitation, though some 
choose to submit “no bid” and others are even less active. 
Winners in reverse auctions can also be based on best value, as opposed to best 
price, where best value includes price, past performance and technical factors—
depending on the needs and preferences of the buyer.8  The buyer states whether the 
award will be based on the lowest price or the best-value in the solicitation.  Depending 
on the size and complexity of the procurement, the buyer might also provide specific 
weights for evaluating price, technical factors, timeliness, and/or past performance.  
Currently, price, delivery time, and past performance are the most common factors used 
by the federal agencies. 
USAAVE has the capability to support best-value auctions using a two-step 
sealed-bidding process; the sellers submit their technical proposal first with all other 
required information (such as company qualifications and past performance 
                                            
8 FAR 13.106-2(4)): For acquisitions conducted using[…] a method that permits electronic response to the 
solicitation, the contracting officer may—(i)[…] identify from all[…] offers received one that is suitable to 
the user, such as the lowest priced brand name product, and quickly screen all lower priced quotations or 
offers based on readily discernible value indicators, such as past performance, warranty conditions, and 
maintenance availability; or (ii) Where an evaluation is based only on price and past performance, make 
an award based on whether the lowest priced of the quotations or offers having the highest past 
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information), so that the buyer can determine if that vendor is a qualified supplier.  
According to CECOM, “Once the evaluation was completed that these [vendors] are 
technically acceptable they would be put in a pool then be invited to go ahead and 
partake in the reverse auction” (Meinert, 2007).  USAAVE also has a weighted value 
function that is particularly useful in determining a best-value award.  Non-price factors 
are evaluated and assigned a subjective adjectival grade in accordance with a 
predetermined grading scale.  After the adjectival rating is assigned to the factors in the 
vendor’s bid, an overall weighting scale is used to calculate a final bid score that is 
posted with the vendor’s bid. Both the buyer and the vendor who submitted the subject 
bid are able to see these weightings, which the agency believes helps to prevent 
protests (Meinert, 2007).   
FedBid has a similar automated best-value weighting tool, but it is currently 
deactivated because its e-RAs are primarily used for competing price-driven 
commodities in a simplified acquisition scenario.  Delivery schedule is the primary factor 
federal agencies consider when they want to include factors other than price.  In this 
case, FedBid encourages vendors to submit multiple bids where the price may be lower 
for slower delivery times and higher for faster delivery times.  The buyer then evaluates 
and selects the winning bidder by trading-off monetary and non-monetary factors as 
accounted for in the solicitation.  The winning bidder may or may not be the “lowest” 
bidder at the conclusion of the auction, depending on the best-value determination.   
One complication is using the best-value approach if uncertainty exists in setting the 
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IV. Procurement Auctions as a Market Research 
Tool:  The I2A2 Mechanism 
A. Introduction 
Any decision a defense organization makes to procure a product or service from 
an external supplier is, in actuality, a series of interdependent decisions.  In particular, 
the procurement decision involves, at a minimum, determining: 
1. What should be procured; 
2. How it should be procured; 
3. From whom it should be procured; and 
4. At what price it should be procured. 
Economic analyses of the procurement process have, to this date, tended to 
focus on the latter three questions while neglecting the prerequisite first question: What 
(precisely) should be procured?  Instead of offering insight into how this primary 
question might be addressed, however, economists have simply assumed the answer to 
be determined a priori: The procuring organization presumably knows what they want, 
the argument goes, so it is fair to assume that the description of what is to be procured 
can be relatively easily determined internally. 
Procurement practitioners are well aware, however, that determining what should 
actually be procured can, contrary to the assumptions of most economists, be a 
complicated and arduous process. For example, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
requires an information gathering phase that may involve conducting extensive market 
research, generating a reasonable cost estimate, identifying basic product 
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Parts 7, 10, & 11).  These tasks require the attention and energies of multiple 
individuals within the organization from contracting officers to end-users. 
Even if economists were to generally recognize that determining what should be 
procured is a complex process, it may nonetheless not be immediately apparent how 
the field of economics can contribute to our understanding of the issue. After all, why 
should not the analysis of this initial stage of the procurement problem simply be left to 
engineers, market researchers, and others? The reason, as we shall see, arises from 
the fact that determining precisely what should be procured requires procuring 
organizations to gather and aggregate a broad set of information that is: 
1. Incomplete—No single actor or organization possesses all of the relevant 
information. The procuring organization may have some 
understanding of its needs but may possess only limited knowledge 
regarding the capabilities of current technology and probably even 
less knowledge about the costs incurred by individual contractors to 
produce this technology. Each individual contractor, on the other 
hand, may have a good understanding of its own cost structure and 
technological capabilities, but may possess only limited knowledge 
about the procuring organization’s true needs or about the cost 
structures and technological capabilities of its competitors.  
2. Diffuse—The relevant information for determining what should be procured 
is spread across numerous organizations. The full gamut of 
information about needs, costs, and capabilities is spread among 
the procuring organization and all of its potential contractors, which 
could be numerous. A key piece of information about state-of-the-
art capabilities, for example, could be possessed by only a single 
contractor while another key piece of information could be 
exclusively possessed by a different contractor. Full information 
aggregation thus requires extracting knowledge from a wide 
number of organizations—a formidable undertaking for traditional 
market research methods. 
3. Private—Information possessed by any organization, particularly about 
costs or capabilities, may be known only within that organization 
and, moreover, the organization may have little incentive to 
truthfully reveal its information. For example, while traditional 
market research might involve asking a contractor how the 
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technology, the contractor has every incentive to convince the 
procuring organization that its needs can best be met by 
technologies in which that particular contractor has a comparative 
cost or capability advantage. Effective information aggregation 
requires the creation of incentives for contractors to truthfully reveal 
their private information. 
While other fields of study have much to contribute to determining precisely what 
an organization should procure, the problem of overcoming the above three 
fundamental information “obstacles” to achieve effective information aggregation is one 
that is ideally suited for economics.  In particular, the economic field of mechanism 
design is devoted to the development of appropriate systems which (a) create 
incentives for individuals and actors to truthfully reveal their private information, (b) 
efficiently aggregate this diverse (and sometimes conflicting) information, and (c) 
identify optimal choices based on the aggregated information. 
In the analysis that follows, we will employ the economic methods of mechanism 
design to develop an iterated procurement auction mechanism which endogenously 
aggregates information and determines what should be procured, how it should be 
procured, from whom it should be procured, and at what price it should be procured. We 
will first introduce an economic model which captures a number of important details 
related to the incentives and information conditions which exist in the procurement 
arena.  We will subsequently present the iterated auction mechanism and illustrate how 
it addresses all four key procurement questions identified above. Finally, we will employ 
computer simulation to evaluate the performance of the proposed auction mechanism 
relative to alternative procurement methods. 
B. Quality and Buyer Incentives 
Whether procuring a new aircraft, a desktop computer, or even lawn-care 
services, in addition to price considerations, there may be a wide number of quality 
dimensions over which to measure a product/service offering from a potential 
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determining which of all the possible quality dimensions should matter and how much 
they should matter. 
For example, determining which type of aircraft to procure is equivalent to 
determining the relative importance of each of a myriad of possible quality dimensions, 
such as speed, maneuverability, range, and so on.  In turn, the relative importance or 
“weight” that a procuring organization places on different quality dimensions will 
determine the types of aircraft offered by contractors and the specific type of aircraft that 
is ultimately acquired. The relative weight placed on each quality dimension also 
indirectly determines which contractor will ultimately produce the aircraft, with the 
winning contractor generally being the one capable of providing the greatest “bang for 
the buck”—“bang” being specifically measured by the weights placed on the various 
dimensions of quality. 
While there will typically be many different dimensions of quality over which to 
evaluate a product or service, in what follows we will simplify our presentation by limiting 
the analysis to two dimensions.  Thus, suppose that the array of quality elements is 
limited to two components: reliability (x) and delivery schedule (y).  Note that the 
analysis that follows can be generalized to a scenario with any number of quality 
elements, but it will simplify the discussion to focus on the two-dimensional case. 
The relative importance of these two quality dimensions to the buyer (i.e., the 
procuring organization) can be expressed by weights placed on the two elements when 
determining overall quality.  In particular, let overall quality be given by αx + βy, where α 
indicates the importance or weight placed on reliability (x) while β is the importance or 
weight placed on delivery schedule (y). A tradeoff between the two elements of quality 
is induced by making the additional assumption that α + β = 100.  Thus, if α is relatively 
high (i.e., reliability is relatively important) then β must be relatively low (i.e., delivery 
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Suppose the buyer procures a product or service with reliability level x and 
delivery schedule y from a chosen contractor, and the buyer pays the contractor a price 
P for this product or service. Then, the overall value (v) to the buyer is determined by 
subtracting price (P) from quality (αx + βy).  In other words, we have: 
overall value
, elements of quality 




v x y P







C. Cost and Seller Incentives 
Each contractor or potential seller has a cost function that is independent of the 
buyer’s value function.  In particular, we assume that any given contractor j who 




total cost from firm 
x, elements of quality
marginal cost parameters for each element of quality, where U[0,10]
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Note that the firm’s cost function is quadratic in order to capture the usual 
condition of increasing marginal costs.  In other words, if the firm increases quality in 
one dimension, costs go up exponentially rather than at a constant rate.  Also note that 
the cost function creates a tradeoff between quality elements: For any given level of 
total cost, any increase in quality element x will necessitate a decrease in quality 
element y and also vice versa. 
Contractor profits are, of course, simply price minus cost. Thus, any given 
contractor j which sells a product or service with quality levels x and y at a price P has a 



















Π = − −
 
D. Buyer and Seller Information 
As noted previously, it is often the case that the buyer in any procurement (the 
DoD in this case) has only imperfect information about its own preferences.  In other 
words, the buyer is not always fully aware of all possible capabilities of available 
technology nor is the buyer fully aware of the precise benefits of these capabilities. 
Similarly, contractors may have better (or at least different) information about the 
capabilities of available technology, but may have only an imprecise understanding of 
the benefits of these capabilities for the buyer. Thus, information about the true nature 
of buyer value is both incomplete and diffuse, as described previously. 
In the model we have presented, the uncertainty about buyer value can be 
captured by assuming that both the buyer (DoD) and the sellers (contractors) have 
incomplete information about the true value of α and β (the weights on the different 
elements of quality) in the buyer’s value function. 
To represent this incomplete information condition, we can envision the 
information about α and β that is held by the buyer and each seller as being provided 
via a series of independent draws by each player from an opaque urn containing 100 
balls.  In this urn, there are α black balls and β white balls (recall that α + β = 100).  An 
individual player (be it a buyer or seller) infers the true number of black and white balls 
in the urn (the true values of α and β) from the information received from its draws (the 
number of black and white balls). 
To represent the different levels of precision in information about buyer 
preferences, suppose that the buyer (DoD) draws mb balls from the urn while each 
seller (contractor) draws ms balls from the urn.  Note that the buyer might have more 
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buyer might have less precise information than each contractor, in which case we would 
have mb < ms. 
Recognize that if the buyer draws B black balls and W white balls from the urn, 
then his ex ante estimates of the values of α and β will be given by: 
buyer's ex ante estimate of the value of



















= × = ×+
= × = ×+
 
Each individual contractor j’s ex ante estimate of the value of α and β (αj and βj) 
will be determined the same way based on the individual contractor’s draws from the 
urn. 
Note that each player’s information about the true value of α and β (i.e., the 
number of black and white balls drawn by that player) is private information, known only 
to that player.  This means that the buyer or any contractor may or may not truthfully 
reveal his or her information about α and β in the process of any procurement 
mechanism. 
Also assumed to be private information are the marginal cost parameters aj and 
bj associated with any contractor j’s cost function. In other words, a contractor’s true 
cost structure is known (ex ante) only to that contractor. 
Before proceeding, it is important to note an important incentive effect of the 
presence of private information about both cost and value in this model: Unless 
somehow induced to truthfully reveal its private information, any contractor j will 
generally seek to convince the buyer that its estimate αj is high (and, thus, its estimate 
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and will generally seek to convince the buyer that its estimate αj is high (and, thus, its 
estimate βj is low) whenever its marginal cost parameter aj is low relative to its cost 
parameter bj. In other words, each contractor has an incentive (ex ante) to deceive the 
buyer in a way that steers the buyer towards quality weights, which correspond with the 
contractor’s own relative cost advantage and thus increases its likelihood of winning the 
contract. 
E. The Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) 
The discussion to this point has simply introduced a model of the procurement 
environment and, thus, has been applicable to any type of procurement mechanism. In 
this section, we will describe our proposed iterated information aggregation auction 
mechanism (hereafter, I2A2 mechanism) and calculate the outcome of this mechanism 
when used in the procurement environment that we have been describing. 
The I2A2 mechanism consists of six stages, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. The 
stages shaded black represent actions by the sellers, the stages shaded white 
represent actions by the buyer or auctioneer, and the stage shaded gray represents the 




Figure 3.   The Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) 
Mechanism 
1. Stage 1: Background 
Stage one is not actually part of the auction mechanism itself; however, it is 
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initial incentives and information that players possess as they participate in the I2A2 
mechanism. 
As part of this stage (and prior to the actual auction), the buyer will be endowed 
with incentives in the form of values for the quality parameters α and β as well as 
estimates αˆ and βˆ  of these parameter values. The buyer will not know the true value of 
α and β and will begin with only the estimates αˆ and βˆ . Recall that these estimates are 
modeled as being based on mb independent draws from an urn containing α black balls 
and β white balls. 
In this pre-auction stage, each seller will similarly be endowed with its initial 
incentive and information condition.  In particular, any seller j will be endowed with 
incentives in the form of values for the cost parameters aj and bj, which are known to the 
seller (and only that seller), as well as estimates αj and βj of the true values of the 
quality parameters α and β. Recall that seller estimates of α and β are modeled as 
being based on ms independent draws from an urn containing α black balls and β white 
balls. 
2. Stage 2: Initial Auction 
In stage two of the game, each contractor j will submit a bid to the buyer (DoD) 
that consists of two quality elements (xj and yj) and a price (Pj). The objective each 
contractor has in stage two is to decide the optimal levels of P, x, and y based on the 
individual contractor cost function and the information about buyer preferences from the 
draw in stage one. 
An individual seller j has two crucial components of information.  First, the 
contractor has complete knowledge of its individual cost function:  
2 2




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 36 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
The contractor also has some information (as much as, but different from, any 
other individual contractor) about the true values of α and β. 
i. The Generalized Second-Price Auction and Truthful Revelation of Costs 
Both the initial and final auction stages will be conducted as a generalized multi-
dimensional second-price auction. This means that the bids will first be ranked 
according to the overall value delivered (as perceived by the buyer), with the value of 
any contractor j’s bid being given by: 
ˆˆj j j jv x y Pα β= + −  
The sellers from the initial auction who are chosen to proceed to the final auction 
will be those sellers who submit the n highest value bids. The winner in the final auction 
will be the seller who submits the highest value bid. The feature that makes the auction 
a generalized second-price auction is that the winning seller in the final auction is not 
paid the price it bid but rather the highest price the seller could have bid and still been 
the winner in the final auction. 
For example, suppose seller j submits a bid (xj,yj,Pj) that generates perceived 
buyer value vj and that seller i submits a bid (xi,yi,Pi) that generates perceived buyer 
value vi. Further suppose that seller j’s bid is the highest value bid and that the seller i’s 
bid is the second-highest value bid. In this case, seller j would win the auction and 
would deliver a product/service with quality dimensions xj and yj, and in return, the buyer 
would pay seller j a price of Pj + (vj - vi). In other words, the winning seller is paid the 
price bid plus the additional value delivered over the second-place bidder. Note that the 
winning seller is consequently always paid as much or more than the price bid. 
This generalized second-price auction format is employed because it induces 
truthful revelation of costs. This well-known characteristic of generalized second-price 
auctions will not be proven here, but the implications in the current context are that it is 
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equal to its cost Cj of delivering a product/service with the quality values xj and yj 
submitted in its bid. Thus, each contractor j will bid such that: 
2 2
j j j j j jP C a x b y= = +  
While the winning seller will not be announced until after the final auction, it is 
important to note that bids placed in the initial auction are also considered binding bids.  
In other words, if it is determined in the last stage of the I2A2 mechanism that a bid 
placed in the initial auction actually delivers higher overall value to the buyer than any 
bid placed in the final auction, then the buyer can (and will) choose as the ultimate 
winning bid the highest-value bid that was placed in the initial auction. Allowing for a bid 
placed in the initial auction to be selected as the ultimate winning bid guarantees that 
bids placed in the initial auction are also truth-revealing (such that any contractor j will 
bid Pj = Cj in the initial auction as well). Note that, if bids in the initial auction were not 
binding, a seller would have an incentive to bid a price that was below cost to increase 
its chances of being identified as a high-value bidder and be selected to participate in 
the final auction. With binding initial bids, it is instead optimal for each contractor to bid 
truthfully (setting price equal to cost). 
An additional important characteristic of the generalized second-price auction is 
that such an auction can generally be expected to produce contract prices that are (in 
expectation) the same as the contract prices that would be generated in a more 
traditional first-price auction (in which the winning seller is paid the exact price it bid). 
Again, this result will not be proven here, but the Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
discussed earlier states that the second-price procurement auction will result in the 
same contract costs on average as a first-price procurement auction, assuming that the 
bidders are risk-neutral and that certain other general conditions hold. In fact, the entire 
analysis which follows can be easily adapted to a mechanism in which first-price 
auctions are employed; however, the analysis would be a bit more complex (the price a 
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calculate the seller’s optimal pricing strategy and then backward-induce its true cost 
from the price bid). 
ii. Eliminating Low-Value Bidders and Truthful Maximization of Value 
As we have noted briefly to this point and as will be addressed in more detail, 
those sellers whose bids in the initial auction generate the lowest overall value for the 
buyer will be eliminated from the process, meaning they will not be invited to submit 
bids in the final auction.  This is an important feature of the mechanism because it 
ensures that it is in each contractor’s best interest to submit an overall bid that, given 
the contractor’s information, maximizes the value it can profitably provide the buyer. 
To understand why contractor elimination is an important feature of the 
mechanism, imagine what would happen if all contractors who bid in the initial auction 
were also invited to bid in the final auction.  As we will see, the I2A2 mechanism is 
designed such that the buyer uses contractor bids placed in the initial auction to update 
its estimate of the importance of various dimensions of quality (i.e., to update its 
estimates of α and β) before proceeding with the final auction. If all contractors who bid 
in the initial auction also bid in the final auction, a contractor would have little incentive 
to offer a bid in the initial auction that maximized buyer value, but would instead have 
every incentive to offer a bid that might simply steer the buyer towards quality weights 
that correspond with the contractor’s own relative cost advantage, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of winning the contract in the final auction. For example, if a seller j had a 
very low value for aj (a low marginal cost of providing quality dimension x), it might offer 
a very high xj in its initial bid in hopes of convincing the buyer that quality dimension x 
was more important than it really was. This would severely undermine the most 
distinctive feature of the I2A2 mechanism, which is truthful information revelation and 
aggregation.  
However, with the provision that only the n highest-value bidders will be able to 
offer bids in the final auction, the I2A2 mechanism creates competition at the initial 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 39 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
submit a bid in the initial auction that truthfully maximizes the value it can profitably 
provide the buyer.  
iii. The Contractors’ Optimal Bidding Strategy 
As we have shown, the use of the generalized second-price auction will induce 
each contractor to bid in a manner that truthfully reveals its cost (i.e. to bid Pj=Cj) and 
eliminating the least-value bidders after the initial auction will induce each contractor to 
bid in a manner that truthfully maximizes buyer value.  Combining these two results 
allows us to calculate each contractor’s optimal bidding strategy. 
In particular, contractor j’s objective in the initial auction is to submit a bid with Pj 
= Cj and also: 
( )2 2
Choose  and  to maximize buyer value
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Given that there is no interaction between xj and yj in the above objective 
function, we can separate the objective into two independent objectives: 
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Each contractor j’s optimal bid can then be determined by differentiating each of 
the above objective functions (and setting the derivative equal to zero) to find the 
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Thus, it is each contractor’s optimal strategy in the initial auction to submit a bid 






















3. Stage 3: Update 
In stage three of the I2A2 mechanism, the buyer updates its own estimates of the 
true values of α and β based on the bids submitted by contractors in the initial auction 
(stage 2). The sellers do not take any action in this stage. 
At this point in the process, the buyer has two components of information from 
which to estimate the true values of α and β.  First, the buyer knows its individual 
estimates from the background stage one (αb and βb).  Additionally, the buyer also 
knows the bids (xj, yj, Pj) from each contractor in the initial auction of stage two. 
Although the individual contractors have not directly revealed their estimates of α 
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Pj) in the initial auction. From our analysis above, we know that optimization by 
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Thus, the buyer can infer any contractor j’s estimates of αj and βj from its bid (xj, 
yj, Pj). Combining these estimates with the buyer’s own estimates αb and βb allows the 
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After the buyer updates its estimates of α and β, the buyer provides an “update” 
to the sellers by announcing the new estimated values αˆ  and βˆ  as calculated above. 
This announcement effectively puts all players (the buyer and all sellers) on equal 
footing in terms of information about the true values of α and β. The buyer has 
effectively aggregated all the diffuse private information about α and β that exists in the 
market and shared this aggregation with all the sellers. Note the number of initial sellers 
is a key variable in the I2A2 mechanism because the larger the pool of information, the 
more accurate the estimatesαˆ  and βˆ  will be in this stage. 
4. Stage 4: Elimination 
In the fourth stage of the I2A2 mechanism, the buyer will rank the sellers 
according to the estimated value delivered by their bids in the initial auction.  In 
particular, the buyer will use the new parameter estimates αˆ  and βˆ  calculated in stage 
three to assign an overall value to each contractor’s bid.  The estimated value to the 
buyer from any contractor j’s bid consisting of quality levels xj and yj with price Pj will 
thus be: 
ˆˆj j j jv x y Pα β= + −  
Assigning a value to each contractor’s bid according to this formula, the 
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contractors, those whose initial bids generated the greatest value, will be allowed to 
continue to the final auction in the following stage.  As noted previously, eliminating 
sellers prior to the final auction is necessary to create competition in the initial auction 
stage and induce each seller to submit an initial bid that truthfully maximizes (to the best 
of the seller’s perception at that point) the value that it can profitably provide the buyer.  
5. Stage 5: Final Auction 
In stage five of the I2A2 mechanism, each seller who was retained from the 
previous stage submits a new bid in a second and final auction.  The bidders in this final 
auction will incorporate the new aggregate estimates of α and β, which were calculated 
and announced by the buyer in stage three. It will again be optimal for each seller to 
truthfully reveal cost as part of its bid (i.e., to bid a price equal to cost) and to bid in a 
manner that truthfully maximizes buyer value. 
Thus, the objective of any contractor j in the final auction is to submit a bid with Pj 
= Cj and to also: 
( )2 2
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This maximization problem is solved in the same manner as was illustrated 
above for the initial auction in stage two.  In a result that parallels the result from the 
initial auction, we find that it is any contractor j’s optimal strategy to submit a bid 




























Note that all sellers have the same information about the buyer’s quality 
parameters α and β in the final auction, thus the only thing that will distinguish the 
sellers’ final bids will be their differing cost parameters aj and bj.  
6. Stage Six: Award 
The last stage of the I2A2 mechanism is the award announcement.  The 
successful seller is the firm whose bid maximizes total value as perceived by the buyer 
(i.e., the one whose bid maximizes ˆˆ j j jx y Pα β+ − ). As noted previously, however, the 
auction is conducted as a generalized second-price auction; therefore, the winning firm 
is not paid its own price bid.  Instead, the winning firm is paid the highest price that it 
could have bid and still won the auction. 
Recall from above that using a generalized second-price auction induces the 
contractors to reveal their true costs and that the Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
implies that the buyer would pay the same price (on average) regardless of whether a 
first-price or second-price auction is used. 
The preceding analysis has allowed us to full characterize the expected behavior 
and outcomes under the I2A2 mechanism.  To evaluate the performance of this 
mechanism, however, we must compare it to more traditional procurement 
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F. The Alternative: Single Procurement Auctions 
To identify and quantify the benefits of using the I2A2 mechanism, we must 
compare it to the more traditional single procurement auction alternative. In what 
follows, we will present four possible variations of the single procurement auction and 
characterize the expected behavior and outcomes under each variation. Each of the 
four variations follows a similar structure as illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Single Procurement Auction Structure 
Figure 4 highlights that the background stage (Stage 1) as described for the I2A2 
mechanism also exists in each of the single-auction variations. In other words, prior to 
the actual auction, the buyer will be endowed with incentives in the form of values for 
the quality parameters α and β as well as estimates αˆ and βˆ  of these parameter 
values. Moreover, each seller j will be endowed with incentives in the form of values for 
the cost parameters aj and bj as well as estimates αj and βj of the true values of the 
quality parameters α and β. 
It is also important to observe from Figure 2 that stage two (“publish”) and stage 
four (“update”) are considered optional. It is the optional nature of these two stages that 
will separate our four variations of the single procurement auction.  The “publish” stage 
involves the buyer communicating αb and βb—its own starting estimates of α and β—to 
the sellers before the auction.  The buyer will publish its prior estimates in two of the 
variations below and the buyer will not in the two other variations. The “update” stage 
involves the buyer updating its estimates of α and β based on the bids submitted by the 
contractors. The buyer will perform an update in two of the variations below and the 
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In each of the variations that follow, we will continue to assume that a 
generalized-second price auction is employed.  This not only assures that we are 
comparing “apples to apples” when comparing alternatives but also greatly simplifies 
the analysis since the generalized second-price auction will induce each contractor to 
bid in a manner that truthfully reveals its cost (i.e. to bid Pj=Cj). Recall that the winning 
bid and the price paid (on average) will be the same for a second-price auction as for 
the first-price auction and, moreover, the entire analysis which follows can be easily 
adapted to variations employing first-price auctions; however, the analysis would be a 
bit more complex. 
1. Variation #1: No Publish / No Update 
The simplest variation of the single procurement auction is one in which the 
buyer neither publishes its own prior estimates of the weights on the various dimensions 
of quality nor does it update its estimates of those weights after observing the bids 
submitted. 
By not updating its estimates of α and β based on seller bids, the buyer is 
essentially relying exclusively on its own prior information about what type of 
product/service will deliver the most value and ignoring any information that the sellers 
might possess. Moreover, the final award will be determined according to the buyer’s 
own prior estimates of α and β. 
By not publishing the weights in advance of the auction, the buyer is essentially 
choosing to not reveal precisely how the auction winner will be determined.  Each seller 
must instead rely only on its own individual prior estimates of α and β when formulating 
a bid. 
This variation of the single auction approximates a situation in which the buyer is 
ambiguous about the evaluation criteria during the solicitation (perhaps to mitigate 
protest risk), but the buyer is fairly certain about the appropriate evaluation criteria and 
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Recognize that the seller’s optimization problem in this variation of the single 
auction is the same as for the initial auction in the I2A2 mechanism. Thus, any seller j’s 






















Since the buyer does not update its estimates of α and β in this variation, the 
winning seller will be the one whose bid maximizes the buyer’s perceived overall value 
according to its prior estimates αb and βb. Thus, the buyer will assign any bid (xj,yj,Pj) a 
value vj = αbxj + βbyj – Pj and the winning bid will be the one which maximizes this value. 
2. Variation #2: No Publish / Update 
A second variation of the single procurement auction is one in which the buyer 
does not publish its own prior estimates of the weights α and β, but does update its 
estimate of those weights after observing the bids submitted. This variation of the single 
auction approximates a situation in which the buyer waits until the bids are submitted to 
determine its evaluation criteria (i.e., the final weights it will place on each dimension of 
quality) and chooses not to communicate its own prior estimate of those weights before 
the auction—perhaps because the prior estimates might differ significantly from the final 
weights used to evaluate bids. 
As with the previous variation (and with the initial auction in the I2A2 mechanism), 
the seller must rely only on its own individual prior estimates of α and β when 




























As in the I2A2 mechanism, the buyer in this variation of the single auction will 
update its estimates of α and β before assigning a value to each submitted bid. In fact, 
because the seller’s optimal bid in this single-auction variation is the same as its optimal 
bid in the initial auction from the I2A2 mechanism, the buyer’s calculation of updated 
estimates of α and β are also the same: 
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In this variation, the winning seller’s initial bid maximizes the buyer’s perceived 
overall value according to these updated estimates of α and β. Thus, the buyer will 
assign any bid (xj,yj,Pj) a value , j j j jˆˆv  = αx  + βy  - P and the winning bid will be the one that 
maximizes this value. 
3. Variation #3: Publish / No Update 
The third variation of the single procurement auction is one in which the buyer 
does publish its own prior estimates of the weights α and β, but does not update its 
estimate of those weights after observing the bids submitted. In other words, in this 
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product/service quality (i.e., its own prior estimates of α and β) but informs the sellers 
upfront exactly how bids will be valued. 
This variation of the single auction approximates a situation in which the buyer 
knows (or at least believes it knows) how product/service offering should be evaluated, 
and the buyer is open and explicit about this knowledge with the sellers.  As with 
Variation #1 discussed previously, by not updating its estimates of α and β based on 
seller bids, the buyer in this variation is essentially relying exclusively on its own prior 
information about what type of product/service will deliver the most value and ignoring 
any information that the sellers might possess. 
In this variation, the contractors know precisely how their bids will be evaluated 
and they will use this information to formulate their bids. In particular, any seller j knows 
that the buyer will assign his bid (xj,yj,Pj) a value vj = αbxj + βbyj – Pj. Thus, it is the 
objective of any contractor j in this variation of the single auction to submit a bid with Pj = 
Cj and to also: 
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This maximization problem is solved in the same manner as previously done.  In 
a result that parallels previous results, we find that each contractor j’s optimal strategy is 





























As already noted, the winning seller in this variation will be the one whose bid 
maximizes the buyer’s perceived overall value according to its prior estimates αb and βb 
(i.e., the bid which maximizes vj = αbxj + βbyj – Pj). 
4. Variation #4: Publish / Update 
The final variation of the single procurement auction is one in which the buyer 
publishes its own prior estimates of the weights α and β, but ultimately evaluates the 
bids based on updated estimates of those weights. This variation of the single auction 
approximates a situation in which the buyer waits until the bids are submitted to 
determine its ultimate evaluation criteria (i.e., the final weights it will place on each 
dimension of quality), but nonetheless chooses to communicate its own prior estimates 
of those weights before the auction, allowing sellers to incorporate this additional 
information into their bids. It is important to note in this variation that the estimated 
weights announced ex ante are different from the weights actually employed ex post to 
evaluate bids, which in actual practice, could increase protest risk. 
In this variation, the sellers have an opportunity to update their own estimates of 
α and β (using the estimates published by the buyer) prior to submitting their bids. In 
particular, a contractor j will update its estimates of α and β by calculate weighted-
averages between its own estimates (αj and βj) and the estimates published by the 
buyer (αb and βb). The weights assigned to each prior estimate will be the number of 
draws from the urn (either ms or mb) associated with the estimates. Thus, seller j’s 
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To formulate its bid, each seller will solve the usual optimization problem using 
























As in the original I2A2 mechanism, the buyer can re-estimate the true values of α 
and β in this variation of the single auction based on the bids submitted by contractors. 
The mathematics of this re-estimation are more complicated in this case, however, 
because the buyer must first extract each seller’s individual updated estimates 
ˆˆ  and j jα β and then, from these individual updated estimates, the buyer must extract 
each seller’s original estimates αj and βj. Nonetheless, the buyer can still infer any 
contractor j’s estimates of αj and βj from its bid (xj, yj, Pj) (we will forgo the 
mathematical demonstration of this inference in the interest of brevity). Combining these 
estimates with the buyer’s own estimates, αb and βb, allows the buyer to generate 
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In this variation, the winning seller’s bid maximizes the buyer’s perceived overall 
value according to these updated estimates of α and β. Thus, the buyer will assign any 
bid (xj,yj,Pj) a value j j j jˆˆv  = αx  + βy  - P , and the winning bid will be the one which 
maximizes this value. 
G. Comparing the Estimation Accuracy of Alternatives 
To this point, we have fully characterized the expected behavior and outcomes 
under the I2A2 mechanism as well as under four different variations of the traditional 
single auction alternative. To assess the value of the proposed I2A2 mechanism, 
however, we must identify and compare measures of performance across the various 
alternatives; the ultimate measure of performance from the buyer’s perspective is the 
overall value that is delivered. 
The particular procurement environment we are investigating is one in which 
there is significant uncertainty, at least initially, about the manner and the degree to 
which any procured product/service will deliver value to the buyer.  Both the seller’s 
ability to deliver value and the buyer’s ability to assess value are constrained by the 
information they possess about the marginal benefit of different dimensions of quality—
about the true values of the parameters α and β. 
Consequently, one important measure by which to compare the alternative 
procurement mechanisms is the accuracy of the parameter estimates used by the buyer 
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the buyer wants when they place their bids, and how well does the buyer know what it 
wants when it selects from among these bids? The more accurate the estimates of α 
and β, the better calibrated will be the sellers’ bids and the buyers’ selection process. 
To begin this comparison, the table below lists, for each procurement alternative, 
(1) the parameter estimates used by the sellers when submitting their bids (more 
specifically, their final bids under the I2A2 mechanism), and (2) the parameter estimates 
used by the buyer when selecting a winner from among these bids. 
Table 4.  Seller and Buyer Parameter Estimates under Procurement Alternatives  
Estimates Used for Final Bid Estimates Used to Select WinnerProcurement 
Alternative Estimate of α Estimate of β Estimate of α Estimate of α 
Single-Auction 
Variation #1: 








































































































































































Among the 20 cells in Table 4 above, there are four different estimates of α and 
four corresponding or parallel estimates of β.  To compare the accuracy of these 
estimates, recall that these estimates are each based on a number of independent 
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described previously.  Consequently, the accuracy of any one of these estimates will 
depend directly on the number of independent observations or draws from the urn that 
are incorporated into the estimate—the greater the number of observations, the more 
accurate the estimate. 
To further our comparison, Table 5 below lists the number of observations and 
resulting accuracy ranking for each corresponding pair of α and β estimates. For 
purposes of the table, we have assumed that mb > ms, or that the buyer has more 
information than any individual seller about the ultimate determinants of quality.  We 
have assumed mb > ms rather than the opposite, not only because it arguably holds true 
(at least marginally) in most cases, but also because any bias it introduces is a bias 
against the proposed I2A2 mechanism. 
Table 5. Observations Aggregated and Accuracy Ranking of Parameter Estimates 
Estimate of α Estimate of β Observations Aggregated Accuracy Ranking 
1
N























m Nm+  1st 











+  b sm m+  2
nd 
αb βb bm  
3rd 
(Assuming mb > ms) 
αj βj sm  
4th 
(Assuming mb > ms) 
 
While Table 5 presents an ordinal ranking of the parameter estimates, it is 
valuable before proceeding to make some observations about the degree of difference 
in accuracy between the various estimates. As noted previously, it may not always be 
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minimal. Consequently, the difference in observations and accuracy between the third 
and fourth-ranked estimates above could be only marginal.  The difference between the 
second and third-ranked estimates above could be somewhat more significant, as mb + 
ms could be two or more times as large as mb; however, our assumption that mb > ms 
implies that there are less than twice the number of observations for the second-ranked 
estimates above as for the third-ranked estimates. Finally, and most importantly, the 
difference between the first and second-ranked estimates above, at least in terms of 
number of observations, is the most significant, as mb + Nms could be several times as 
large as mb + ms. 
With the ranking of the various estimates in hand, we can now proceed to rank 
the various procurement alternatives in terms of overall accuracy. Thus, Table 6 
presents, for each procurement alternative, (1) the ranking of estimates used by sellers 
when submitting their final bid, (2) the ranking of estimates used by the buyer when 
selecting a winner from among these bids, and (3) a combined overall accuracy ranking.  




Estimates Used for 
Final Bid 
Ranking of 







No Publish / No Update
4th 3rd 5th 
Single-Auction 
Variation #2: 
No Publish / Update 
4th 1st 3rd 
Single-Auction 
Variation #3: 
Publish / No Update 
3rd 3rd 4th 
Single-Auction 
Variation #4: 
Publish / Update 









do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 56 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
In most cases, the overall accuracy ranking of a procurement alternative is easily 
determined; however, the relative positioning of the “no publish / update” and “publish / 
no update” alternatives is slightly less straightforward. Nonetheless, the previous 
discussion regarding the degree of difference in accuracy between various measures 
dictated that the former be ranked third and the latter ranked fourth. 
The most important result presented in Table 6 is that the I2A2 mechanism clearly 
comes out as the top-rated alternative in terms of the accuracy of parameter estimates 
used in the process of bidding and bid selection. The accuracy advantage of the I2A2 
mechanism over the other alternatives depends primarily on the number of sellers (N) 
and the amount of information possessed by those sellers (ms)—the larger either 
variable, the greater the advantage. 
H. Simulating the Procurement Alternatives 
The previous section provided a general qualitative comparison among the 
procurement alternatives and concluded that the I2A2 mechanism is expected to provide 
better calibrated bidding and bid selection and, consequently, deliver greater overall 
value to the buyer. The magnitude of this advantage, however, was left undetermined.  
In this section, we will simulate the various procurement alternatives to provide 
quantitative measures comparing the various mechanisms. 
To observe and measure the performance of the I2A2 mechanism and other 
procurement alternatives, we conducted mathematical simulations of a series of 
scenarios matching the procurement environment modeled above.  The outcome under 
each of the five different procurement alternatives was recorded and evaluated for each 
simulated scenario. 
1. Input Parameters  
The simulation analysis involved a total of 150,000 trials conducted using the 
Crystal Ball simulation add-in program for Microsoft Excel.  Figure 5 below summarizes 
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between the simulation trials and the model described above, each key input parameter 
in the figure is labeled in red with its corresponding parameter value as described in our 
previous model analysis. 
Sellers 6 Round 1 100
Retained 2 Draws α Draw α β  ai bi
Seller 1 5 2 40.0 60.0 4.38626 1.61734
Seller 2 5 3 60.0 40.0 5.80848 0.5585
Seller 3 5 2 40.0 60.0 3.49799 4.00502
Seller 4 5 4 80.0 20.0 2.46414 2.90553
Seller 5 5 4 80.0 20.0 4.24947 6.83271
Seller 6 5 0 0.0 100.0 1.97578 2.6196
Seller 7 5 2 40.0 60.0 6.64869 4.69526
Seller 8 5 4 80.0 20.0 9.28329 7.23153
Seller 9 5 4 80.0 20.0 6.29437 1.61405
Seller 10 5 4 80.0 20.0 2.39273 4.15416
Buyer 15 7 46.7 53.3
Binomial Actual Values










Figure 5.   Simulation Input Parameters as Displayed in Microsoft Excel 
The fundamental parameters varied in each trial were the underlying quality 
parameters α and β as well as the cost parameters for each contractor aj and bj. For 
each trial, the quality parameter α was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution 
between 0 and 100, with the quality parameter β then set equal to 100-α.  Values of aj 
and bj for each contractor were similarly randomly drawn each trial from a uniform 
distribution between 0.5 and 9.5. 
With these basic parameters randomly drawn, further random draws determined 
the buyer and seller prior estimates of α and β for each trial. The buyer’s estimate αb 
was determined by simulating mb draws from a binomial distribution with a probability 
corresponding to the true value of α previously determined, with βb then set equal to 
100-αb. Similarly, each seller’s estimate αj was determined by simulating ms draws from 
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determined, with βj then set equal to 100-αj. The updated estimates αˆ and βˆ  were 
calculated according to the formulas presented previously. 
The values for mb and ms (the number of “draws from the urn” for the buyer and 
sellers, respectively) as well as the values for N (the total number of sellers) and n (the 
number of sellers retained after the initial auction in the I2A2 mechanism) were pre-
determined for each trial.  Each of these four variables (mb, ms, N, and n) took one of 
two possible values during the simulations with the six different variations of variable 
values illustrated in Table 7. A total of 25,000 simulation trials were conducted for each 
variation. 
Table 7.  Procurement Simulation Variations 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Buyer's Draws 15 15 5 5 15 15
Sellers' draws 15 15 15 15 5 5
Beginning Sellers' 10 4 10 4 10 4
Retained Sellers' 5 2 5 2 5 2
Simulation #
 
We were interested in observing outcomes under various information conditions 
and therefore, as seen from Table 7, two of the simulation variations modeled the buyer 
and each seller with an equal number of draws (mb=ms=15), two of the variations 
modeled the buyer with fewer draws (less information) than each seller (mb=5, ms=15), 
and two of the variations modeled the buyer with more draws (more information) than 
each seller (mb=15, ms=5). 
We were also interested in observing outcomes under various levels of 
competition (different numbers of sellers) and therefore, as again seen from Table 7 
above, half the simulation variations involved 10 total sellers (N=10), while half involved 
only 4 total sellers (N=4). In each variation, only 50% of the total buyers were retained 
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2. Bids, Values, and Winners 
A series of intermediate “process” variables were calculated for each 
procurement alternative for each of the 150,000 simulation trials conducted. Figure 6 
below illustrates these intermediate variables for a single trial as viewed in Excel for two 
of the five procurement alternatives: The “publish / no update” variation (on the left) and 
“publish / update” variation (on the right) of the single procurement auction. 
 Perceived Actual  PerceivedActual
X Y P Gov Value Gov Value Rank  α β X Y P Gov ValueGov ValueRank
5.3 16.5 564$        564$       415$       2 1 45.0 55.0 5.1 17.0 583$       460$      405$      4
4.0 47.7 1,367$     1,367$    784$       1 1 50.0 50.0 4.3 44.8 1,227$    1,009$   822$      1 1
6.7 6.7 333$        333$       333$       5 45.0 55.0 6.4 6.9 334$       329$      327$      5
9.5 9.2 466$        466$       470$       4 55.0 45.0 11.2 7.7 481$       482$      498$      3
5.5 3.9 232$        232$       253$       6 55.0 45.0 6.5 3.3 252$       253$      268$      6
11.8 10.2 547$        547$       569$       3 35.0 65.0 8.9 12.4 558$       486$      469$      2 1
1,367$    784$       1,009$   822$      
Buyer Surplus 564$       (19)$        Buyer Surplus 486$      299$      
Seller Surplus 803$       Seller Surplus 523$      
Check 1,367$    Check 1,009$   
Option 4:  One Stage-Buyer Publishes & Updates
Buyer ex post Weights
Option 3:  Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex ante Weights
 
Figure 6.   Simulation Process Variables as Displayed in Microsoft Excel 
First of all, bids of the form (xj,yj,Pj) were calculated for each seller in each trial 
and for each procurement alternative.  In the “publish / update” variation of the single 
procurement auction, this first requires calculating an updated weighted-average re-
estimation of α and β, as described previously and as illustrated in the right side of 
Figure 6. Seller bids for all other procurement alternatives were calculated using either 
seller prior estimates (αj and βj), buyer prior estimates (αb and βb), or buyer updated 
estimates ( αˆ  and βˆ ), which were calculated and shown previously in Figure 5. 
Next, the buyer’s perceived value was calculated for each seller bid, with the 
perceived value based on either the buyer’s prior or updated estimates of α and β, 
depending on the procurement alternative. For the I2A2 mechanism as well as the “no 
Actual buyer surplus
Perceived buyer surplus 
Supplier surplus
Perceived total surplus 
Seller bids Value given buyer ex-post estimates of α & β 
Value given actual α & β values Sellers’ updated estimates 
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publish / update” and “publish / update” variations of the single procurement auction, the 
buyer uses updated estimates of α and β to value seller bids; thus the value assigned to 
seller j’s bid was j j j jˆˆv =αx +βy -P  under each of these three alternatives. For the “no 
publish / no update” and “publish / no update” variations of the single procurement 
auction, the buyer uses its prior estimates of α and β to value seller bids, thus the value 
assigned to seller j’s bid was vj=αbxj+βbyj-Pj under each of these two alternatives. In 
each trial and for each procurement alternative, the actual or true value of each seller’s 
bid was also calculated using the true (but unknown) values of α and β, assigning to 
each seller j’s bid a value of vj=αxj+βyj-Pj. 
Next, the seller bids were ranked according to the buyer’s perceived value and 
the winning and second-place bids were identified. Recall that a generalized second-
price auction is employed, so the price paid to the winning seller in each trial and for 
each alternative was the price bid by the winning seller plus the difference in value 
between the first-place and second-place bids.  
3. Buyer Surplus, Seller Surplus, and Total Surplus 
The final set of intermediate variables shown in Figure 6 and calculated for each 
trial and each procurement alternative involves buyer and seller surplus. Buyer surplus 
is generally defined as the value of the product/service received minus the price paid, 
while supplier surplus is defined as price received minus the cost incurred. To facilitate 
the explanation of how these variables are calculated in the simulation, the following 
definitions and notation are helpful: 
(x1,y1,P1) = winning bid 
q1 = perceived quality of winning bid 
 = 1 1ˆαˆx +βy  under I
2A2, “no publish / update” & “publish / update” 
 = αbx1+βby1 under “no publish / no update” & “publish / no update” 
q* = true quality of winning bid 
 = αx1+βy1 
v1 = perceived value of winning bid 
 = q1 - P1 
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C1 = cost of winning bid 
 = P1 
P* = price paid to winning seller (under generalized second-price auction) 
 = P1 + v1 - v2 
 = P1 + (q1 - P1) - v2 
 = q1 - v2 
With the notion of quality described above, we can redefine buyer surplus as 
quality minus price paid. Thus, the two notions of buyer surplus (perceived and actual) 
were calculated in the simulations as follows: 
Perceived buyer surplus = Perceived quality minus price paid 
 = q1 – P* 
 = q1 - (q1 - v2) 
 = v2 
Actual buyer surplus = Actual quality minus price paid 
 = q* – P* 
 = q* - (q1 - v2) 
 = v2 + q* - q1 
Thus, perceived buyer surplus and actual buyer surplus will differ by the amount 
the buyer is “off” in its perception of the quality of the product/service it is receiving. If 
the buyer overestimates the quality of the winning bid, actual surplus will be less than 
perceived surplus.  If the buyer underestimates the quality of the winning bid, actual 
surplus will be greater than perceived surplus. Note, however, that the buyer is more 
likely to have overestimated than to have underestimated the quality of the winning bid 
because a significant underestimate of the quality of the winning bid would result in a 
different bid being ranked first among the seller bids. Consequently, it will more often be 
the case that the actual buyer surplus is less than the perceived buyer surplus than vice 
versa.   
To understand the calculation of seller surplus, we can use the fact that the 
winning seller bids P1 = C1. Also note that there is no “perceived” seller surplus 
because, unlike the buyer, the seller is assumed to have no uncertainty about its 
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Seller surplus = Price received minus cost incurred 
 = P* - C1 
 = P1 + v1 - v2 - C1 
 = P1 + v1 - v2 - P1 
 = v1 - v2 
Finally, total surplus is simply defined as the sum of buyer and seller surplus.  
Thus, we have 
Perceived total surplus = Perceived buyer surplus + seller surplus 
 =  v2 + (v1 - v2) 
 =  v1 
 =  q1 - P1 
Actual total surplus = Actual buyer surplus + seller surplus 
 =  v2 + q* - q1 + (v1 - v2) 
 =  v1 + q* - q1 
 =  (q1 - P1) + q* - q1 
 =  q* - P1 
 
4. Summary Statistics for an Individual Trial 
After calculating the input parameters, bids, winner, and surpluses for each 
procurement alternative for an individual trial, the simulation produced the most 
important information to be extracted from the trial: Summary statistics to compare 

























Option 1  $        554  $     146  $     725  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 46.7 53.3 5.2 35.8 871$     110.24% 28.99% 196.98% 100.00% 1
Option 2  $        432  $     291  $     580  $     871 2 60.0 40.0 55.4 44.6 5.2 35.8 871$     85.99% 57.86% 157.55% 100.00% 1
Option 3  $        564  $      (19)  $     803  $     784 2 46.7 53.3 46.7 53.3 4.0 47.7 1,367$  112.11% -3.83% 218.11% 89.99% 1
Option 4  $        482  $     296  $     526  $     822 2 50.0 50.0 55.4 44.6 4.3 44.8 1,227$  95.93% 58.80% 142.94% 94.37% 1
Option 5  $        483  $     320  $     541  $     861 2 55.4 44.6 55.4 44.6 4.8 39.9 1,023$  95.95% 63.66% 146.78% 98.80% 1
 $        503  $     503  $     368  $     871 2 60 40 60 40 12.2 6.9 503$     
Buyer Evaluates X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex ante  Weights
Two Stage-Buyer Updates
Buyer ex post  Weights
Perfect Information
One Stage-Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex post Weights
Seller Chooses X, Y
Buyer Doesn't Publish
Buyer ex post Weights
Buyer Publishes
Buyer ex ante Weights
 
Figure 7.   Summary Statistics for an Individual Trial as Displayed in 
Microsoft Excel 
% of perfect info outcome 
Does winning seller match 
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The most important summary statistics are highlighted in the last few columns of 
the chart in Figure 7 and were calculated by comparing the outcome under each 
procurement alternative with the outcome under a “perfect information” procurement 
auction. The perfect information procurement auction is one in which there is no 
uncertainty; the buyer and all sellers know the precise values of α and β throughout the 
process.  The outcome under this hypothetical scenario is displayed in the bottom row 
of Figure 7. 
Any of the procurement alternatives conducted in a perfect information 
environment would guarantee that the buyer receives the absolutely highest value (true 
quality minus true cost) product/service that can be produced by any of the available 
sellers, and that, correspondingly, the seller that can meet the buyer’s needs most 
efficiently wins the auction.  Furthermore, the highest possible total surplus would 
always be realized in a perfect information environment. In this way, the perfect 
information procurement auction represents an ideal benchmark (although purely 
hypothetical and unachievable) against which to evaluate each of the procurement 
alternatives. 
Thus, the most important summary statistics for any individual trial convey the 
level of each surplus (perceived buyer surplus, actual buyer surplus, seller surplus, and 
total surplus) actually achieved under each procurement alternative as a percentage of 
the same surplus that would be achieved under the perfect information scenario. These 
percentages are shown on the right hand side of Figure 7. 
In the very last column of Figure 7 is a summary statistic labeled “consistency.” 
This indicates whether the winning seller under a given procurement alternative is the 
seller that would have been chosen under the perfect information scenario.  Thus, the 
consistency measure can be understood as an indication of whether a particular 
procurement alternative has chosen the “correct” contractor from whom a 
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5. Summary Statistics Across All Trials 
Having described the summary statistics as calculated for an individual 
simulation trial, we are now prepared to examine the summary statistics averaged 
across all 25,000 trials for each simulation variation. These average statistics for each 
procurement alternative and each simulation variation are provided in Table 8.  
Table 8.  Summary Statistics by Procurement Alternative and Simulation Variation    
Auction Option 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
No publish choice ex ante (O-1)
  Mean perceived buyer surplus 97.71 94.16 103.23 95.03 89.89 85.01 94.17
  Mean actual buyer surplus 80.64 81.68 63.26 62.26 70.47 68.31 71.10
  Perceived less actual 17.07 12.48 39.97 32.77 19.42 16.7 23.07
  Mean total surplus 89.64 90.78 84.96 86.7 81.84 81.66 85.93
  Consistency 25 19 32 26 32 26 26.67
No publish choice ex post (O-2)
  Mean perceived surplus 95.71 94.95 95.79 95.02 88.42 86.07 92.66
  Mean actual surplus 92.71 91.98 92.78 92.19 80.83 78.95 88.24
  Perceived less actual 3 2.97 3.01 2.83 7.59 7.12 4.42
  Mean total surplus 94.2 94.04 94.26 94 85.71 84.79 91.17
  Consistency 10 8 10 8 22 19 12.83
Publish choice ex ante (O-3)
  Mean perceived surplus 108.27 105.62 123.36 117.2 108.09 105.53 111.35
  Mean actual surplus 77.62 76.07 41.75 32.92 78.04 75.85 63.71
  Perceived less actual 30.65 29.55 81.61 84.28 30.05 29.68 47.64
  Mean total surplus 90.18 91.8 76.1 77.78 90.4 91.61 86.31
  Consistency 20 13 26 19 19 13 18.33
Publish choice ex post (O-4)
  Mean perceived surplus 98.46 97.95 97.12 96.51 98.94 97.95 97.82
  Mean actual surplus 95.54 94.98 94.12 93.69 91.61 91.08 93.50
  Perceived less actual 2.92 2.97 3 2.82 7.33 6.87 4.32
  Mean total surplus 96.64 96.76 97.11 95.28 94.49 94.71 95.83
  Consistency 8 5 10 8 11 8 8.33
Multi-stage auction (O-5)
  Mean perceived surplus 100.83 99.7 100.87 99.77 100.1 95.93 99.53
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 95.19
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3 2.88 7.36 6.94 4.34
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.04
  Consistency 7 5 7 7 13 12 8.50
Simulation Variation
 
Comparisons across variations will be discussed in some detail below, so it is 
helpful at this point to focus on the last column in Table 8, which provides the mean 
statistics across all variations for the five procurement alternatives. 
Because the buyer is generally the party that chooses among procurement 
alternatives, it is perhaps most instructive to look at what is at stake for the buyer and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 65 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
surplus of 95.2% of the perfect information outcome, the I2A2 mechanism outperforms 
the four single-auction alternatives, which achieve mean buyer surpluses of 71.1%, 
88.2%, 63.7%, and 93.5%. 
The I2A2 mechanism also significantly outperforms the four single auction 
alternatives in terms of total surplus with a mean of 98.0% of the perfect information 
outcome vs. 85.9%, 91.2%, 86.3%, and 95.8% for the single-auction variations. The I2A2 
mechanism’s consistency measure was also significantly better than all but one of the 
single-auction variations. 
A key factor from Table 8 appears to be the buyer using updated estimates to 
choose among bids, as the two alternatives in which the buyer relied only on its own 
prior estimates of the quality parameters resulted in perceived buyer surplus values 
23.1 and 47.6 percentage points higher than the actual buyer surplus.  Under the three 
alternatives in which the buyer used updated estimates, in contrast, perceived buyer 
surplus differed from actual buyer surplus by only 4.4, 4.3, and 4.3 percentage points. 
6. The I2A2 Mechanism vs. the Single-Auction Alternatives 
To further investigate the advantages of the I2A2 mechanism over the single-
auction alternatives, this section will compute the “delta” or improvement afforded by the 
I2A2 mechanism across the various performance metrics. This delta will be calculated as 
a percentage of the metric’s value under the single-auction alternative to which the 
comparison is being made. 
To start, let us measure the degree of improvement provided by the I2A2 mechanism 
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Table 9.  The I2A2 Mechanism vs. All Four Single-Auction Variations  
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
Mean Single-stage Auction
  Mean actual surplus 86.63 86.18 72.98 70.27 80.24 78.55 79.14
  Perceived less actual 13.41 11.9925 31.8975 30.675 16.0975 15.0925 19.86
  Consistency 15.75 11.25 19.5 15.25 21 16.5 16.54
  Mean total surplus 92.665 93.345 88.1075 88.44 88.11 88.1925 89.81
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.1300 0.1230 0.3411 0.3789 0.1558 0.1329 0.2103
  Perceived less actual -0.7808 -0.7565 -0.9059 -0.9061 -0.5428 -0.5402 -0.7387
  Consistency -0.5556 -0.5556 -0.6410 -0.5410 -0.3810 -0.2727 -0.4911
  Mean total surplus 0.0671 0.0609 0.1217 0.1185 0.0958 0.0889 0.0921  
 
Observe that the I2A2 mechanism achieves 21% more actual buyer surplus and 
9% more total surplus than the average single procurement auction.  The I2A2 
mechanism also cuts in half (down 49%) the frequency with which a “wrong” (or 
inefficient) seller is selected. Significantly contributing to these results is the fact that the 
I2A2 mechanism reduces the amount by which the buyer overestimates the value 
delivered by the winning bidder by a dramatic 74%. 
These results may actually understate the improvement promised by the I2A2 
mechanism, however, because the best performing single-auction alternative—the 
“publish / update” variation (variation #4)—may not be allowed under federal law.  In 
particular, the “publish / update” option involves publishing or announcing preliminary 
decision criteria (the buyer’s prior estimates of α and β), which differ from the ultimate 
decision criteria (updated estimates of α and β) that are used to select the auction 
winner.  Our understanding of FAR section 15.301 (“Proposal Evaluation”) of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation suggests that such a procedure would be prohibited 
from use by federal contracting officers. 
Thus, it is perhaps better to measure the degree of improvement provided by the 
I2A2 mechanism over the average of the “permissible” single-auction variations #1 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 67 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
Table 10.  The I2A2 Mechanism vs. Single-Auction Variations #1 - #3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean 
Mean Single-stage Auction
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 74.35
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 25.04
  Consistency 18.33 13.33 22.67 17.67 24.33 19.33 19.28
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 87.80
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.1701 0.1626 0.4845 0.5513 0.2131 0.1966 0.30
  Perceived less actual -0.8396 -0.7810 -0.8676 -0.8370 -0.6975 -0.6410 -0.78
  Consistency -0.62 -0.63 -0.69 -0.60 -0.47 -0.38 -0.56
  Mean total surplus 0.0825 0.0740 0.1612 0.1481 0.1229 0.1164 0.12  
Observe that the I2A2 mechanism now achieves fully 30% more actual buyer 
surplus and 12% more total surplus than the average of the three remaining single-
auction variations.  The I2A2 mechanism also reduces the frequency with which the 
“wrong” (or inefficient) seller is selected by more than half (down 56%). Again, 
significantly contributing to these results is the fact that the I2A2 mechanism reduces by 
fully 78% the amount by which the buyer overestimates the value delivered by the 
winning bidder. 
Finally, it may also be valuable to specifically compare the I2A2 mechanism to 
single-auction variation #3, the “publish / no update” alternative.  This comparison is 
particularly important because it is the “publish / no update” variation which appears to 
correspond most closely with the approach encouraged by status quo FAR policy: The 
buyer fully articulates the criteria in advance and uses these same criteria to evaluate 
the bids submitted. This comparison between the I2A2 mechanism and the “publish / no 
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Table 11.  The I2A2 Mechanism vs. the “Publish / No Update” Variation 
Publish choice ex ante (O-3)
  Mean actual surplus 77.62 76.07 41.75 32.92 78.04 75.85 63.71
  Perceived less actual 30.65 29.55 81.61 84.28 30.05 29.68 47.64
  Mean total surplus 90.18 91.8 76.1 77.78 90.4 91.61 86.31
  Consistency 20 13 26 19 19 13 18.33
Multi-stage Delta
  Mean actual surplus 0.2611 0.2722 1.3442 1.9432 0.1884 0.1732 0.6971
  Perceived less actual -0.9041 -0.9012 -0.9632 -0.9658 -0.7551 -0.7662 -0.8759
  Mean total surplus 0.0965 0.0788 0.2987 0.2718 0.0680 0.0482 0.1437
  Consistency -0.6500 -0.6154 -0.7308 -0.6316 -0.3158 -0.0769 -0.5034  
When compared to this status quo policy alternative, the I2A2 mechanism 
represents a truly eye-opening improvement. The I2A2 mechanism achieves fully 70% 
more actual buyer surplus and 14% more total surplus than the “publish / no update” 
variation.  The I2A2 mechanism continues to reduce the frequency with which a “wrong” 
(or inefficient) seller is selected by half (down 50%), and reduces the amount by which 
the buyer overestimates the value delivered by the winning bidder by 88%. In fact, 
among all of the single-auction variations, the “publish / no update” alternative is the 
worst performer by most measures, suggesting that the I2A2 mechanism may represent 
a particularly significant improvement over the status quo in the presence of quality (or 
value) uncertainty.   
7. The Influence of Varying Competition and/or Information 
The analysis to this point clearly suggests that the I2A2 mechanism may provide 
significant opportunities for performance improvement over single-auction alternatives.  
For purposes of “real-world” application, however, we would like to know the conditions 
under which the I2A2 mechanism offers the greatest potential.  For this reason, we also 
investigated the performance of all procurement alternatives under various levels of 
competition and information.  In particular, the simulations were conducted under six 
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Table 12.  Levels of Competition and Information by Simulation Variation 
 Information & Competiton 1 2 3 4 5 6
Buyers' draws 15 15 5 5 15 15
Sellers' draws 15 15 15 15 5 5
Number of sellers' entering auction 10 4 10 4 10 4
Number of seller draws 150 60 150 60 50 20
Total number of draws 165 75 155 65 65 35
Simulation #
 
As shown in Table 12, simulation variations 1, 3, and 5 incorporated a high level 
of competition with 10 total sellers (underlined), while variations 2, 4, and 6 incorporated 
a low level of competition with only 4 total sellers. Meanwhile, simulation variations 1, 2, 
and 3 were the three highest-information scenarios with 165, 75, and 155 total “draws,” 
respectively; variations 4, 5, and 6 were the three lowest-information scenarios with 65, 
65, and 35 total “draws,” respectively. 
The improvement afforded by the I2A2 mechanism in high-competition vs. low-
competition scenarios as well as in high-information vs. low-information scenarios is 
presented in Table 13. Note that Table 13 only includes the three single-auction 
variations that are not prohibited by regulation (variations #1 to #3). 
Table 13.  Improvement from I2A2 Mechanism as Competition & Information Vary 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean             
high-competion
Mean          
low-competion
Mean     high-
info draw
Mean      low-
info draw
Multi-stage auction 
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 96.17 94.22 97.51 92.87
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3.00 2.88 7.36 6.94 4.43 4.25 2.95 5.73
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.09 97.99 98.91 97.17
  Consistency 7.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 13.00 12.00 9.00 8.00 6.33 10.67
Mean Single-stage Auction (Opt. 1-3)
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 75.34 73.36 77.61 71.09
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 25.82 24.26 24.48 25.60
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 87.48 88.13 89.55 86.05
  Consistency 18.33 13.33 22.67 17.67 24.33 19.33 21.78 16.78 18.11 20.44
Multi-stage auction Improvement
  Mean actual surplus 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.31
  Perceived less actual -0.83 -0.82 -0.88 -0.78
  Mean total surplus 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.13
  Consistency -0.59 -0.52 -0.65 -0.48  
 
Observe that the degree of improvement provided by the I2A2 mechanism is 
virtually the same along most performance measures in both the high-competition and 
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improvement in the low-information scenarios than in the high-information scenarios.  
This suggests that the I2A2 mechanism may offer about the same benefits, regardless of 
the level of competition, but offers the greater benefits in low-information environments. 
In addition to the overall level of information in the environment, it is also 
instructive to consider which side of the market possesses the most information. In 
particular, note from Table 12 that the buyer has less information than each individual 
seller in simulation variations 3 and 4, while the buyer has more information than each 
individual seller in simulation variations 5 and 6. This allows us to compare the 
improvement provided by the I2A2 mechanism under these two information-balance 
scenarios; the results of this comparison are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14.  Improvement from the I2A2 Mechanism as Information Balance Varies 
1 2 3 4 5 6
sellers' draws  
exceed buyer's
buyer's draws   
exceed sellers'
Multi-stage auction 
  Mean actual surplus 97.89 96.78 97.87 96.89 92.74 88.99 97.38 90.87
  Perceived less actual 2.94 2.92 3 2.88 7.36 6.94 2.94 7.15
  Mean total surplus 98.88 99.03 98.83 98.92 96.55 96.03 98.88 96.29
  Consistency 7 5 7 7 13 12 7.00 12.50
Mean Single-stage Auction (Opt. 1-3)
  Mean actual surplus 83.66 83.24 65.93 62.46 76.45 74.37 64.19 75.41
  Perceived less actual 16.91 15.00 41.53 39.96 19.02 17.83 40.75 18.43
  Mean total surplus 91.34 92.21 85.11 86.16 85.98 86.02 85.63 86.00
  Consistency 18 13 23 18 24 19 20.17 21.83
Multi-stage auction Improvement
  Mean actual surplus 0.52 0.20
  Perceived less actual -0.93 -0.61
  Mean total surplus 0.15 0.12
  Consistency -0.65 -0.43  
First, observe from Table 14 that if the buyer were to conduct a single 
procurement auction, it would clearly prefer having more information than the individual 
sellers, as opposed to the opposite (75% vs. 64% actual buyer surplus).  Contrarily, the 
situation is reversed under the I2A2 mechanism (91% actual buyer surplus when the 
buyer has more information vs. 98% when individual sellers have more information).  
This reflects the fact that the I2A2 mechanism fully aggregates the sellers’ information, 
both to improve seller bids and to improve buyer bid selection, whereas the single 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 71 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
=
More importantly, Table 14 indicates that the I2A2 mechanism offers significantly 
greater improvement over the single-auction alternatives when the sellers have better 
information relative to the buyer (52% increase in buyer surplus vs. only 20% when the 
buyer has more information). This strongly suggests that the I2A2 mechanism offers the 
greatest promise in environments in which contractors are likely to have more 
information about what type of product/service might best serve the buyer’s needs. 
Such environments might include markets for relatively new products or services, 
markets in which technology is advancing rapidly, or markets in which the buyer is a 
relatively inexperienced consumer. 
I. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have introduced an integrated auction mechanism that 
endogenously addresses four key questions associated with any procurement decision: 
1. What should be procured? 
2. How it should be procured? 
3. From whom it should be procured? 
4. At what price it should  be procured? 
This mechanism is called the iterated information aggregation auction 
mechanism, or the I2A2 mechanism for short, and applies concepts from the field of 
mechanism design to overcome problematic incentive and information conditions that 
pervade procurement environments.  In particular, the I2A2 mechanism is designed to 
truthfully extract and efficiently aggregate all relevant information in situations in which 
such information is incomplete, diffuse and private. 
We have demonstrated that the design of the I2A2 mechanism induces sellers to 
truthfully reveal information about buyer value and seller cost, and it also offers the best 
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to single procurement auction alternatives illustrated that the proposed mechanism 
promises significantly more accurate calibration of estimates both for sellers to offer the 
strongest bids and for the buyer to properly choose a winner from among those bids. 
Finally, simulation analysis has revealed that the I2A2 mechanism offers the 
potential to provide the buyer 30% or more additional surplus (price minus true value) 
than the available single-auction alternatives and to dramatically reduce the problem of 
overestimating bid values, which is endemic to the single procurement auctions. 
Investigating the performance of the I2A2 mechanism under various competitive and 
information conditions, we further found that the mechanism performs comparably well 
under both high-competition and low-competition scenarios, but appears to be most 
valuable in environments with relatively low information, especially when contractors 
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V. Compatibility in Auctions with Asymmetric 
Information  
One form of information imperfection and asymmetry involves costs and the 
relative importance of product characteristics, as explored above.  Another form of 
information asymmetry involves the fit between the buyer and seller. For a wide range 
of commercial arrangements, a high degree of compatibility between a buyer and seller 
raises the value of the contract for both parties. For instance, a good match between 
authors and their editors may generate a better selling book, and an athletic team is 
more likely to win games if the players have compatible skills. In some cases, 
compatibility is so important that it is the primary determinant of contract value. A recent 
study by accounting giant KPMG indicated that “83% of all mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) failed to produce any benefit for shareholders and over half actually destroyed 
value.” Interviews of over 100 senior executives revealed that the overwhelming cause 
of failure was “the people and the cultural differences” or the poor quality of the match 
(Gitelson et al., 2001).  
Given the impact of matching on contract value, it is not surprising that we 
observe sellers using matching as a factor in their choice of buyer. The problem in many 
cases is that the quality of the match may not be apparent until well after contracting 
has occurred. An author and editor may have an impression of how well they will work 
together, but neither party will be certain of their compatibility until after the publishing 
contract has been signed and work has begun.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate what mechanism the seller should use 
to allocate contracts in situations in which matching is the primary determinant of 
contract value, but information about match quality is incomplete.  We develop a model 
in which a single seller seeks to contract with one of several buyers. Each pairing of 
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the contract. The better the match, the more each party values the contract. We 
consider the following three information structures: 
Complete information – For each pairing of seller and buyer, both the seller 
and buyer know the quality of the match. This case 
serves as a benchmark.  
Informed seller – For each pairing of seller and buyer, only the seller 
knows the quality of the match. The buyer knows the 
distribution from which the match quality was drawn.  
Informed buyer – For each pairing of seller and buyer, only the buyer 
knows the quality of the match. The seller knows the 
distribution from which the match quality was drawn.  
For the complete information case, we show that the seller’s best strategy is to 
approach the buyer with the best match quality and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the 
amount of the buyer’s value for the contract. The contract is allocated efficiently and the 
seller captures the entire surplus. For the informed seller case, the seller should, once 
again, approach the buyer with the best match and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. 
However, the buyer does not know the quality of the match in this case, so the amount 
of the offer is set to the buyer’s expected value for the contract. For the informed buyer 
case, we show the seller should hold a first-price auction with an elevated reserve price. 
The auction not only stimulates competition among the buyers but also provides a 
vehicle through which the buyers can signal their private information to the uninformed 
seller. These results are developed in the sections that follow.  
A. The Model  
A seller offers a contract to one of n risk-neutral buyers (n = 2). Every potential 
pairing of seller and buyer has an associated match. We denote the match between the 
seller and buyer i by ⊂∈ ],[ θθθi , where ji θθ >  indicating that buyer i has a better 
match than does buyer j.  We assume the si 'θ  are independently and identically 
distributed according to a commonly known cumulative distribution function (cdf) F with 
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Assumption 1: F has positive density f at every ],[ θθθ ∈i . 
Buyer i’s utility from contracting with the seller is: 
ii t−θ ,  
where iθ is buyer i’s value for the contract and ∈it  is the payment made by 
buyer i. Buyer i’s utility is zero if not contracted with the seller.  
The seller derives utility from both the payment and the match with the buyer. We 
assume the seller’s utility from contracting with buyer i is: 
ii tV +)(θ ,  
where )( iV θ  represents the seller’s value for the match with buyer i. The 
following assumption captures the notion that a good match raises the value of the 
contract for both the seller and the buyer:  
Assumption 2: V →],[ θθ   is continuous and strictly increasing over ],[ θθ . 
The seller’s utility is zero if contracted with any buyer.9  
If the seller were to contract with buyer i, the total economic surplus generated 
would be iiV θθ +)( , where )( iV θ  represents the seller’s value for contracting with buyer i 
and iθ represents buyer i’s value for contracting with the seller. If the seller were to 
retain the contract, the total economic surplus generated would be zero. It follows that 
                                            
9 When V ( iθ )= v iθ , where v is a positive constant, our model can be mapped to the interdependent 
valuations framework outlined in Section 5 of Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001): simply let the agents be 
indexed by i ∈{0, 1, 2, ..., n}, where agent i is the seller if i = 0 and buyer i otherwise; let ikp  be the 
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when the surplus generated is positive, a mutually beneficial trade exists. The following 
assumption is imposed so as not to rule out the possibility of such a mutually beneficial 
trade.  
Assumption 3 (participation condition): θθ +)(V is positive.  
Additionally, we impose the following regularity condition:  









θθθ −−+  
is strictly increasing over ],[ θθ .10 
B. Complete Information  
In this section, we assume that both the seller and buyer know the quality of the 
match for each pairing of seller and buyer. This case serves as a benchmark because 
asymmetric information is not an issue.  
We know that when the contract is allocated to buyer i, the surplus generated is 
iiV θθ +)(  and that when the contract is not allocated, the surplus generated is zero. By 
Assumption 2, iiV θθ +)( is increasing in iθ . Let )(nθ  represent the nth order statistic; that 
is, let: 
},....,,max{ 21)( nn θθθθ ≡&& . 
If 0)( )()( ≥+ nnV θθ , the surplus is maximized by allocating the contract to the 
buyer with best match quality. If 0)( )()( <+ nnV θθ , the surplus is maximized by not 
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allocating the contract. If the contract is allocated so as to maximize the surplus, the 
allocation is said to be efficient.  
We will show that under the complete information paradigm, the seller can both 
allocate the contract efficiently and appropriate the entire surplus. Consider the 
following mechanism:  
1. After observing the vector of matches ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ), the seller identifies 
the buyer with the best match quality (i.e., the buyer whose match quality 
equals )(nθ ).  
2. If 0)( )()( <+ nnV θθ , the seller retains the contract, and every agent earns 
zero utility.  
3. If 0)( )()( ≥+ nnV θθ , the seller approaches the buyer identified in (1) and 
offers the contract at a price of )(nθ . If the buyer accepts the offer, the 
seller earns utility of )()( )( nnV θθ + . If the buyer rejects the offer, the seller 
earns utility of zero. In either case, every buyer earns zero utility.  
Since every buyer’s reservation utility is zero and the mechanism delivers zero 
utility to every buyer in every case, the buyers are willing to participate in the 
mechanism. In other words, the mechanism is individually rational for the buyers.  
The mechanism is optimal in that it maximizes the seller’s expected utility. Since 
the mechanism allocates the contract efficiently, total surplus is maximized. In addition, 
if we assume the buyer accepts the offer (being indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting), the seller captures the entire surplus in every case. The seller can do no 
better without the ability to force a buyer to participate in an arrangement that would be 
worse than the status quo.  
C. Informed Seller  
In this section, we introduce an asymmetry in the information structure. It is 
assumed that the seller is better informed about the matches than the buyers. The seller 
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( nθθθ ,....,, 21 )). However, the buyers do not observe the matches. Their beliefs about 
the matches are determined by the prior distribution F and any action taken by the 
seller.  
Although the seller possesses all the information, the entire surplus will generally 
not be captured. The issue is that the buyers do not know the quality of their matches. 
To illustrate, suppose θθ =)(n . Since θθ +)(V > 0 (see Assumption 3), the seller 
approaches the buyer with the best match quality and offers the contract at a price θ . 
However, since the buyer does not know the quality of the match, it is unclear that that 
the contract is worth θ . The only clear thing is that the seller approached the buyer and 
therefore the match must be the highest quality (i.e., )(nθ ). Without knowing that θθ =)(n , 
the buyer is unwilling to pay θ . Consequently, the seller is unable to capture the entire 
surplus, θθ +)(V .  
Clearly, the seller would like to convey the information about the quality of the 
matches so that the entire surplus could be captured. A straightforward declaration is 
not credible (the seller would declare that θθ =)(n  irrespective of whether or not it were 
true) and therefore ineffective. Any information must be transmitted via the mechanism 
itself. For instance, if the mechanism directs the seller to always approach the buyer 
with the best match, any approached buyer can infer that the quality of the match is )(nθ . 
In contrast, the buyers do not have any private information. Nothing is gained by 
designing a mechanism that would allow buyers to convey their information. For these 
reasons, we focus our attention on mechanisms in which the seller makes offers to the 
buyers and disregard mechanisms in which the buyers make offers to the seller (e.g., 
auctions).  
We proceed by constructing the best take-it-or-leave-it offer sellers can 
implement when they are the informed party. We begin by asserting that when sellers 
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for this. First, since )( iV θ  increases with iθ , the sellers simply get more value from 
contracting with a well-matched buyer. Second, if the sellers systematically approach 
the buyer with the best match, the approached buyer will update his or her belief about 
the quality of the match accordingly. In raising the estimated quality of the match, the 
buyer raises his or her willingness to pay for the contract. As a result, the seller can 
demand a higher price.  
We now address what that price should be. In the complete information case, the 
realized matches ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ) determine whether the seller makes an offer and what 
the proposed price is if the seller makes an offer. In the informed seller case, the 
realized matches determine whether an offer is made but is not the proposed price. For 
any realization of ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ) such that the seller does make an offer, the proposed 
price will be the same.  
The reason the proposed price cannot vary with the realization is that the seller 
will want to deviate to the highest acceptable price. For instance, consider a mechanism 
that directs the seller to propose a price of t’ when the realized matches are 
( n',....,',' 21 θθθ ) and a price of t’’ when the realized matches are ( n'',....,'','' 21 θθθ ). If 
t’’ >t’, the seller will want to deviate by proposing t’’ even when the realized matches are 
( n',....,',' 21 θθθ ). Since the approached buyer does not observe the matches, it will 
assume the realization is ( n'',....,'','' 21 θθθ ) and be willing to pay the proposed price of 
t’’.  
Let t represent the price proposed by the seller when an offer is made. We now 
identify the realizations of ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ) for which the seller approaches a buyer and 
proposes t. Since the seller always approaches the best-matched buyer, the only 
relevant parameter is )(nθ . When 0)( )( ≥+ tV nθ , the seller prefers to make the offer; 
when 0)( )( <+ tV nθ , the seller would rather retain the contract. Since t is fixed and V is 
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the offer but when )(*)( tn θθ < , the seller retains the contract. We formally define this 





















Given this threshold, we calculate the highest price an approached buyer is 
willing to pay. An approached buyer knows that it is the buyer with the best match and 
that the quality of the match is at least )(* tθ . Therefore, the expected value for the 
contract is equal to the expected value of the match iθ  conditional on ji θθ ≥  for all 

















We have constructed a function that gives the minimum match quality *θ in terms 
of the proposed price t and another function that gives the proposed price t in terms of 
the minimum match quality *θ . It remains to identify a pair ( ISIS t,*θ ) that is consistent 
with both functions. In other words, the pair ( ISIS t,*θ ) must satisfy ISISt ** )( θθ = and 
ISIS tt =)( *θ . Since *θ (t) is a non-increasing function and t( *θ ) is a non-decreasing 








Figure 7.  Best Take-It-Or-Leave-It Offer with an Informed Seller 
This completes our construction of the best take-it-or-leave-it offer the seller can 
implement.11 The mechanism is summarized as follows:  
1. After observing the vector of matches ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ), the seller identifies 
the buyer with the best match quality (i.e., the buyer whose match quality 
equals θ (n)).  
2. If ISn *)( θθ < , the seller retains the contract, and every agent earns zero 
utility.  
3. If ISn *)( θθ ≥ , the seller approaches the buyer identified in (1) and offers the 
contract at a price of tIS . If the buyer accepts the offer, it earns utility of 
IS
n t−)(θ . The seller earns utility of ISn tV +)( )(θ , and every other buyer 
earns zero utility. If the buyer rejects the offer, every agent earns zero 
utility.  
The mechanism is individually rational for the buyers. Recall that every buyer’s 
reservation utility is zero. When ISn *)( θθ < , the buyers earn zero utility and are therefore 
                                            
11 Whether or not this mechanism is optimal as defined by Myerson (1983) has not been determined yet. 
We have shown the mechanism is not a strong solution. However, we suspect no strong solution exists 
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indifferent about participating in the mechanism. When ISn *)( θθ ≥ , the approached buyer 
earns utility of ISn t−)(θ . Since tIS may be greater than, less than, or equal to )(nθ , the 
buyer’s actual utility may be positive, negative, or zero. However, the buyer’s expected 
utility is zero since tIS is the expected value of )(nθ  conditional on ISn *)( θθ ≥ . It follows that 
the approached buyer is indifferent about accepting the offer, as well as indifferent 
about participating in the mechanism. Unapproached buyers earn zero utility and are 
therefore indifferent about participating in the mechanism as well.  
The mechanism is generally not efficient. When a mutually-beneficial exchange 
exists (i.e., when 0)( )()( ≥+ nnV θθ , the contract is allocated to the buyer with the best 
match, and efficiency is achieved. However, there are cases in which it would be 
efficient for the seller to retain the contract, but the contract is allocated anyway. That is, 
the frequency of trade is too high. This may occur when the (uninformed) buyer’s 
expected value for the contract tIS exceeds the realized value for the contract )(nθ . Since 
IS
n t<)(θ , it could the case that ISnnn tVV +≤<+ )(0)( )()()( θθθ . The seller makes the offer 
because 0)( )( >+ ISn tV θ . The buyer accepts the offer because it expects to earn zero 
utility but then regrets the decision when it is discovered that 0)( <− ISn tθ .  
When the mechanism fails to allocate the contract efficiently, total surplus is not 
maximized. However, the surplus that is generated accrues to the seller in expectation. 
For some realizations of ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ), the seller appropriates less than the total 
surplus generated. For other realizations of ( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ), the seller appropriates more 
than the total surplus generated (while the buyer earns negative utility). But on average, 
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D. Informed Buyer  
In this section, the asymmetry in the information structure is reversed. We 
assume the buyers are better informed about the matches than the seller is. Each buyer 
observes the quality of the match with the seller. The seller does not observe the 
matches. The seller’s belief about the matches is determined by the prior distribution F 
and the actions taken by the buyers.  
This case is examined at length in Lamping (2007). Lamping shows that the 


















An auction is preferred in this setting not only because it generates competition 
among the buyers but also because it allows the buyers to transmit their private 
information through their bids. The higher the quality of a buyer’s match, the higher the 
value for the contract, and the higher the bid. The result is that the contract is sold to the 
most compatible buyer at a price that is correlated with its willingness to pay for the 
contract.  
The auction mechanism is generally not efficient. When the contract is allocated, 
the allocation is efficient. However, there are cases in which it would be efficient to 
allocate the contract, but the seller retains the contract anyway. That is, the frequency of 
trade is too low. This occurs because the prescribed reserve price is artificially high. 
Since 0)( ** >+ IBIBV θθ , it is possible to have 0)( )()(*)( >+< nnIBn Vbut θθθθ . That is, a 
mutually-beneficial exchange exists 0)( )()( >+ nnV θθ but does not occur because the 
most compatible buyer’s value for the contract ( )(nθ ) falls short of the reserve price 
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When the auction fails to allocate the contract efficiently, total surplus is not 
maximized. Moreover, only a portion of the surplus generated accrues to the seller. 
Because the buyers make the offers, they generally bid less than their value for the 
contract. Hence, any buyer whose match quality exceeds IB*θ earns positive utility in 
expectation. The seller appropriates less than the total surplus for every realization of 
( nθθθ ,....,, 21 ) and in expectation.12 
E. Conclusion  
We have shown that the optimal mechanism depends on which side of the 
market is better informed about the quality of the matches. When the seller is the 
informed party, the seller’s best strategy is to approach the most compatible buyer and 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. When the buyers are better informed, the seller’s best 
strategy is to implement a first-price auction.  
One of the limitations of this study is that it considers only those cases in which 
one side of the market is perfectly informed. In reality, neither the seller nor the buyer is 
likely to be perfectly informed, but each party may have an impression (i.e., observe a 
signal) about the quality of the match. We would like to examine this case in the future 
so as to identify how the optimal mechanism would balance the advantages of a take-it-
or-leave-it offer with those of a first-price auction.  
                                            
12 There are two exceptions. When IBn *)( θθ = , the seller earns IBIBV ** )( θθ + , capturing the entire 
surplus. When )(nθ  satisfies 0)( )()( ≤+ nnV θθ , the seller retains the contract, earning zero utility and 
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VI. Summary, Conclusions and Issues for Further 
Research 
The Department of Defense (DoD) participates in procurement transactions that 
involve several buyer-seller environments.  As a consumer of standard commercial 
commodities, such as pencils and paper, it participates in markets with many buyers 
and sellers, though the size of defense purchases often makes DoD an atypical 
consumer in these markets.  As a consumer of specialized defense products, DoD 
operates as single buyer with anywhere from a single to several potential suppliers, 
depending on the uniqueness of the defense product. 
Economic theory suggests that traditional markets are most effective when there 
are many potential buyers and sellers, and products are relatively standardized.  In 
traditional markets, competition between both buyers and sellers ensures that the 
market establishes an efficient price to balance supply and demand.  Bargaining 
generally characterizes situations in which markets are thin and there are few buyers 
and sellers.  Reverse auctions are increasingly used in cases in which there is only one 
buyer and several sellers.  Given the diversity of procurement environments facing DoD, 
one would expect to see DoD exploiting a variety of transaction mechanisms, including 
traditional markets, bargaining and reverse auctions. 
This research has described the current application of reverse auctions in the 
federal procurement process, focusing primarily on the Department of Defense.  In 
general, reverse auctions have been limited to procurement actions involving relatively 
standard price-driven commercial products—products typically purchased through 
traditional competitive markets.  It appears that DoD has substituted reverse auctions 
for the market research required in the standard DoD procurement processes; the 
auction service providers are replacing federal procurement agents in advertising the 
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Cost estimates indicate that DoD has realized substantial savings by 
implementing reverse auctions, as measured by comparing the independent 
government price estimate to the final auction price.  It appears these savings primarily 
reflect an increase in competition for these solicitations.  As competition increases, DoD 
is more likely to find a lower cost provider and sellers are likely to offer more competitive 
prices.  Presumably, DoD could realize similar savings if it expanded its market 
research in the traditional procurement process; the commercial RA providers simply 
offer a cost-effective means to accomplish this goal. 
As DoD explores expanding its use of reverse auctions and other procurement 
mechanisms into areas where DoD is the single buyer and suppliers might vary from 
one to many, information asymmetries are a critical factor.  As such, this research has 
explored two scenarios involving information asymmetries: reverse auctions in which 
the buyer and sellers are imperfectly informed about tradeoffs between price and other 
product characteristics (technical, schedule and contractor capabilities) and transactions 
in which the quality of fit between buyers and sellers is uncertain but affects the 
transaction’s value.  The research showed potential performance improvements when 
decentralized trade-off information is centralized through the two-stage Iterated 
Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2).  The research also developed optimal 
mechanisms under different information environments for transactions in which the 
quality of buyer/seller fit is important; transactions in which both parties know the quality 
of fit and transactions in which only one party (either the buyer of sellers) know the 
quality of fit. 
The research reported here represents the early stages of research addressing 
how DoD can better structure its procurement transactions, incorporating recent 
developments in the economics literature regarding information asymmetries and 
mechanism design.  There are several extensions to this research.  The I2A2 
mechanism shows promise in theory; it would be useful to conduct economics 
experiments using this mechanism to see if actual performance corresponds to the 
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extended to situations with greater uncertainty (e.g., where the buyer does not know the 
seller’s cost function) and to centralize other information asymmetries. 
It is important to note that this two-stage auction is conceptually different than the 
two-stage auctions currently supported by FedBid and USAAVE.  FedBid and USAAVE 
support two-stage auctions in which the first stage involves seller prequalification (as 
opposed to information aggregation); only some of the initial participants are invited to 
bid in the second round and price becomes the dominant decision criteria.  The 
alternative to a prequalification stage is to conduct the procurement in a single stage, 
using a multi-criteria scoring rule to aggregate price and seller qualifications when 
selecting the winning bid.  Further research could help determine the relative 
performance of these two competing approaches. 
These research topics, among others, would help move reverse auctions in DoD 
beyond a substitute for market research and into more appropriate reverse auction 
settings with a single buyer and multiple sellers.  In addition, this line of research could 
begin addressing DoD’s bargaining mechanisms for transactions involving a single 
buyer and single seller.  Is DoD appropriately structuring its bargaining and contractual 
relationships considering the incentive and information asymmetries involved in these 
relationships?  Expanding this research along these lines would address the full range 
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Appendix A. FedBid Auction Results By NAICS Code 
NAICS Code Total $ Value # of Auctions 
10—Weapons $554,200 17 
12—Firing/Targeting Control Equipment $2,099,228 17 
13—Ammunition and Explosives $34,651,901 506 
15—Aircraft and Airframe Structural Components $8,763 2 
16—Aircraft Components and Accessories $368,422 11 
17—Aircraft Launching, Landing, and Ground Handling Equipment $83,563 4 
18—Space Vehicles $250,098 10 
19—Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons, and Floating Docks $44,968 2 
20—Ship and Marine Equipment $2,788,571 121 
23—Ground Effect Vehicles, Motor Vehicles, Trailers, and Cycles $37,087,642 82 
24—Tractors $585,789 9 
25—Vehicular Equipment Components $2,399,645 92 
26—Tires and Tubes $3,707 1 
28—Engines, Turbines, and Components $93,321 3 
29—Engine Accessories $13,109 3 
30—Mechanical Power Transmission Equipment $53,183 5 
31—Bearings $9,760 1 
32—Woodworking Machinery and Equipment $102,318 8 
34—Metalworking Machinery $362,799 32 
35—Service and Trade Equipment $847,296 71 
36—Special Industry Machinery $1,810,460 146 
37—Agricultural Machinery and Equipment $190,192 6 
38—Construction, Mining, Excavating, and Highway Maintenance 
Equipment $2,463,516 25 
39—Materials Handling Equipment $2,109,289 46 
40—Rope, Cable, Chain, and Fittings $26,757 2 
41—Refrigeration, Air Conditioning, and Air Circulating Equipment $20,223,969 1148 
42—Fire Fighting, Rescue, and Safety Equipment; and Environmental 
Protection Equipment and Materials $3,509,469 145 
43—Pumps and Compressors $115,786 9 
44—Furnace, Steam Plant, and Drying Equipment $232,686 6 
45—Plumbing, Heating, and Waste Disposal Equipment $332,227 18 
46—Water Purification and Sewage Treatment Equipment $800,384 10 
47—Pipe, Tubing, Hose, and Fittings $30,201 4 
48—Valves $21,934 3 
49—Maintenance and Repair Shop Equipment $292,149 19 
51—Hand Tools $688,410 61 
52—Measuring Tools $35,892 6 
53—Hardware and Abrasives $566,725 25 
54—Prefabricated Structures and Scaffolding $2,198,937 17 
55—Lumber, Millwork, Plywood, and Veneer $426,995 8 
56—Construction and Building Materials $724,450 30 
58—Communication, Detection, and Coherent Radiation Equipment $55,748,663 1060 
59—Electrical and Electronic Equipment Components $1,803,555 86 
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61—Electric Wire, and Power and Distribution Equipment $1,481,774 58 
62—Lighting Fixtures and Lamps $632,231 29 
3—Alarm, Signal and Security Detection Systems $11,826,216 296 
65—Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Equipment and Supplies $7,277,606 374 
66—Instruments and Laboratory Equipment $31,457,032 396 
67—Photographic Equipment $2,928,020 221 
68—Chemicals and Chemical Products $3,509,048 9 
69—Training Aids and Devices $1,089,371 31 
70—Information Technology (ADP) Equipment (Including Firmware), 
Software, Supplies and Support Equipment $532,692,444 9079 
71—Furniture $8,270,443 433 
72—Household and Commercial Furnishings and Appliances $3,342,412 157 
73—Food Preparation and Serving Equipment $1,264,194 35 
74—Office Machines, Text Processing Systems and Visible Record 
Equipment $8,679,210 434 
75—Office Supplies and Devices $19,296,494 865 
76—Books, Maps, and Other Publications $359,569 31 
77—Musical Instruments, Phonographs, and Home-type Radios $823,596 36 
78—Recreational and Athletic Equipment $445,603 22 
79—Cleaning Equipment and Supplies $68,041 10 
80—Brushes, Paints, Sealers, and Adhesives $40,943 4 
81—Containers, Packaging, and Packing Supplies $1,397,181 54 
83—Textiles, Leather, Furs, Apparel and Shoe Findings, Tents and Flags $1,091,170 67 
84—Clothing, Individual Equipment, and Insignia $9,153,946 105 
85—Toiletries $20,751 2 
87—Agricultural Supplies $107,918 1 
88—Live Animals $423,628 9 
89—Subsistence $2,031,537 6 
91—Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes $42,255 1 
93—Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials $127,501 5 
95—Metal Bars, Sheets, and Shapes $298,327 7 
96—Ores, Minerals, and Their Primary Products $19,407 1 
99—Miscellaneous $4,400,679 162 
B—Special Studies and Analyses $19,931 1 
C—Architect and Engineering Services—Construction $23,718 2 
D—Information Technology (IT/ADP) and Telecommunication Services $5,340,822 26 
Directed Buys—Direct Buys for Individual Buyers $189,965,843 1302 
F—Natural Resources Management $2,335,218 3 
H—Quality Control, Testing and Inspection Services $5,016 2 
J—Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment $427,208 16 
M—Operation of Government-owned Facility $786,779 39 
N—Installation Equipment $1,667,932 30 
Q—Medical Services $24,869 4 
R4—Professional Service $297,939 6 
R6—Administrative Support Service $31,098 1 
R7—Management Support Service $278,173 16 
S1—Utilities $256,295 4 
S2—Housekeeping Services $462,948 8 
T—Photographic, Mapping, Printing, and Publication Services $240,184 4 
U—Education and Training Services $1,658,763 45 
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W—Lease or Rental of Equipment $636,115 8 
X—Lease or Rental of Facilities $29,870 1 
Y—Construction of Structures and Facilities $1,100,939 44 
   
TOTAL $1,037,440,499 18,401 
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Appendix B. USAAVE Reverse Auction Savings 
USAAVE REVERSE AUCTION SAVINGS: FY00 - FY07 










(1) Ricoh Secure Fax System $6,891.00 $5,511.00 20.03% $1,380.00  2 
(2) IBM Thinkpads $14,000.00 $6,560.00 53.14% $7,440.00  3 
(5) IntelliFAX-2750 $2,500.00 $2,200.00 12.00% $300.00  2 
(100) Connector plugs $118,000.00 $78,000.00 33.90% $40,000.00  2 
(20) Pentium 
computers/items $46,000.00 $37,000.00 19.57% $9,000.00  5 
(10) Pentium servers $41,000.00 $24,900.00 39.27% $16,100.00  6 
(135) Pentium 
computers/items $256,500.00 $175,500.00 31.58% $81,000.00  5 
(140) Pentium 
minitowers/items $266,000.00 $205,800.00 22.63% $60,200.00  4 
(40) Pentium 
computers/items $60,000.00 $53,600.00 10.67% $6,400.00  4 
(1) Photo-workshop $7,000.00 $7,000.00 0.00% $0.00  1 
(520) Pentium servers $806,000.00 $582,400.00 27.74% $223,600.00  6 
(40) Pentium 
computers/items $76,000.00 $58,800.00 22.63% $17,200.00  5 
(1) Lot Lumber $17,000.00 $15,400.00 9.41% $1,600.00  3 
(100) Caprines 
(Goats/Livestock) $13,000.00 $10,000.00 23.08% $3,000.00  5 
(1) Lexar PC Card Type II $12,200.00 $7,600.00 37.70% $4,600.00  5 
(1) Lot Dishwasher (100 
each) $22,000.00 $15,700.00 28.64% $6,300.00  14 
(1) Lot Waterheater (100 
each) $20,000.00 $12,200.00 39.00% $7,800.00  6 
(140) Brake shoe 2530-00-
602-5783 $114,100.00 $98,000.00 14.11% $16,100.00  3 
(308) Hydrolic Wrench $434,280.00 $434,280.00 0.00% $0.00  1 
(35 - 1 Lot) Collar Assembly 
Part $145,425.00 $121,500.00 16.45% $23,925.00  7 
(200 - 1 Lot) Office Supplies $10,000.00 $6,000.00 40.00% $4,000.00  9 
(1) Lot SUN equipment $500,000.00 $368,007.00 26.40% $131,993.00  16 
(40) Laptop computers $186,000.00 $108,000.00 41.94% $78,000.00  3 
(1) Lot SUN equipment/Msg 
Sys $230,000.00 $138,850.00 39.63% $91,150.00  3 
(1) Lot Appliances 
(Washer/Dryer) $42,000.00 $33,600.00 20.00% $8,400.00  8 
(109 - 1 Lot) Desktop 
Computers $197,000.00 $115,000.00 41.62% $82,000.00  4 
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(1) Lot Sun Equipment & 
Services $1,847,000.00 $1,717,500.00 7.01% $129,500.00  9 
(1) Lot Sun Equipment & 
Services $1,052,000.00 $959,000.00 8.84% $93,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Eyepiece Assembly $550,000.00 $261,500.00 52.45% $288,500.00  2 
(1) Lot Modular Office 
Furniture $24,000.00 $17,400.00 27.50% $6,600.00  3 
(1) Lot Computer Systems $149,000.00 $149,000.00 0.00% $0.00  4 
(1) Lot Wood Chips $29,000.00 $25,000.00 13.79% $4,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Modular Office 
Furniture $91,300.00 $69,500.00 23.88% $21,800.00  4 
(1) Lot Refrigeration 
Equipment $36,000.00 $27,433.32 23.80% $8,566.68  5 
(1) Lot Pump Assembly $522,750.00 $425,850.00 18.54% $96,900.00  6 
(370) Desktop PCs—Energy 
Dept $592,370.00 $388,500.00 34.42% $203,870.00  4 
(1) Lot Dual-line Phones $19,500.00 $17,100.00 12.31% $2,400.00  5 
(1) Lot Metal Desks $53,000.00 $36,900.00 30.38% $16,100.00  2 
(6) HAZMAT Storage 
Buildings $42,000.00 $28,770.00 31.50% $13,230.00  5 
(1) Lot Projectors, Screens, 
etc. $34,000.00 $28,550.00 16.03% $5,450.00  5 
(62) Monitors $99,200.00 $85,250.00 14.06% $13,950.00  9 
(1) Lot Desktop Computers $2,200,000.00 $1,800,000.00 18.18% $400,000.00  4 
(154) Desktop Pentium III $211,971.76 $160,160.00 24.44% $51,811.76  9 
(137) Antennas, AS-3244/TS $164,400.00 $164,400.00 0.00% $0.00  3 
(1) Lot Eyepiece Assembly $421,000.00 $421,000.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(6000) Hose Clamps $25,500.00 $21,000.00 17.65% $4,500.00  4 
(50) Contract Closeout 
Services $10,000.00 $4,450.00 55.50% $5,550.00  5 
(1) Lot Desktop/Laptop 
Computers $389,000.00 $353,000.00 9.25% $36,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Desktop Computers $95,200.00 $83,500.00 12.29% $11,700.00  3 
(1) Lot Objective Mount 
Assembly $228,000.00 $228,000.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(1) Lot Battery Chargers $263,500.00 $160,000.00 39.28% $103,500.00  5 
(100) Contract Closeout 
Services $25,000.00 $8,000.00 68.00% $17,000.00  8 
(1) Lot Objective Mount 
Assembly $497,500.00 $497,500.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(1) Lot Water Safety Promo 
Items $36,000.00 $36,000.00 0.00% $0.00  6 
(1) Lot Leveling Jacks $159,600.00 $159,600.00 0.00% $0.00  3 
(1) Lot Appliances $330,000.00 $270,000.00 18.18% $60,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Loudspeakers $1,863,190.00 $963,190.00 48.30% $900,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Hydraulic Components $630,000.00 $305,000.00 51.59% $325,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Floor Polish $7,500.00 $5,000.00 33.33% $2,500.00  6 
(1) Lot Vapor Protective Suits $8,100.00 $5,300.00 34.57% $2,800.00  4 
(1) Lot Vinson Test Set $355,000.00 $203,000.00 42.82% $152,000.00  5 
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(1) Lot Notebooks, CPUs & 
Monitors $61,648.00 $47,748.00 22.55% $13,900.00  5 
(1) Lot HP Laser Printers 
1200N $17,250.00 $16,050.00 6.96% $1,200.00  2 
(1600) Desktop computers $1,920,000.00 $1,440,000.00 25.00% $480,000.00  6 
(200) Computer Monitors $25,000.00 $22,000.00 12.00% $3,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Adapter Antenna $191,100.00 $118,100.00 38.20% $73,000.00  5 
(1) Lot CPUs and Notebooks $1,881,059.00 $1,084,059.00 42.37% $797,000.00  8 
(1) Lot Transformer Assembly $420,000.00 $195,000.00 53.57% $225,000.00  4 
(381) Mounting Bracket 
Assembly $156,210.00 $53,340.00 65.85% $102,870.00  4 
(1) Lot Removable Canopy $1,320,000.00 $1,100,000.00 16.67% $220,000.00  5 
(179) 2KW Diesel Engines $250,600.00 $232,700.00 7.14% $17,900.00  4 
(53) 3KW Diesel Engines $79,500.00 $60,950.00 23.33% $18,550.00  4 
(1) Lot Intermediate Power 
Assembly $337,280.00 $150,280.00 55.44% $187,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Computers $140,000.00 $95,000.00 32.14% $45,000.00  2 
(2465) PIN $3,327.75 $2,218.50 33.33% $1,109.25  4 
(1) Lot Removable Canopy $240,000.00 $195,000.00 18.75% $45,000.00  4 
(1600) Antenna Adapter $160,000.00 $104,000.00 35.00% $56,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Transformer Assembly $55,000.00 $38,000.00 30.91% $17,000.00  4 
(57) Mark 124 Warheads $114,000.00 $113,430.00 0.50% $570.00  2 
(1) Lot Notebooks/Laser 
Printers $875,000.00 $515,000.00 41.14% $360,000.00  8 
(1600) Antenna Adapter $160,000.00 $88,000.00 45.00% $72,000.00  4 
(235) Displacement 
Gyroscopes $1,903,500.00 $1,257,250.00 33.95% $646,250.00  3 
(1) Lot Cable Switch 
Assembly $200,000.00 $127,500.00 36.25% $72,500.00  2 
(1) Lot Coupler, Rotary Radio $690,000.00 $680,000.00 1.45% $10,000.00  2 
(1) Lot Aluminum Benches $10,000.00 $4,800.00 52.00% $5,200.00  4 
(1) Lot Patriot Missile Spares $2,500,000.00 $1,568,000.00 37.28% $932,000.00  3 
(1) Lot Lawn Mowers $19,000.00 $19,000.00 0.00% $0.00  6 
(1) Lot Vacuum Cleaners $27,500.00 $20,500.00 25.45% $7,000.00  5 
(1) Lot Pagers $2,500.00 $800.00 68.00% $1,700.00  3 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $36,000.00 $11,400.00 68.33% $24,600.00  4 
(1) Lot Quick Erect Antenna 
Mast $4,500,000.00 $2,205,000.00 51.00%
$2,295,000.0
0  5 
(1) Lot Generator Air Coolers $120,000.00 $90,000.00 25.00% $30,000.00  5 
(1) Lot PC/Notebooks $65,600.00 $65,600.00 0.00% $0.00  12 
(1) Lot Telephone Circuit 
Trunk Jack $90,000.00 $90,000.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(1) Lot Refrigerators $52,000.00 $44,600.00 14.23% $7,400.00  3 
(100)  ea 3KW Diesel 
Engines $120,000.00 $120,000.00 0.00% $0.00  4 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $93,400.00 $82,000.00 12.21% $11,400.00  4 
(1) Lot Intercomm Set Control $112,500.00 $95,700.00 14.93% $16,800.00  3 
(1) Lot 
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(100)  ea 3KW Diesel 
Engines $140,000.00 $140,000.00 0.00% $0.00  4 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $400,000.00 $220,000.00 45.00% $180,000.00  5 
(1) Lot Movable Canopy $1,165,000.00 $870,000.00 25.32% $295,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Desktop 
PC/Notebooks $1,500,000.00 $1,089,000.00 27.40% $411,000.00  12 
(1) Lot Desktop 
PC/Notebooks $1,001,150.00 $671,150.00 32.96% $330,000.00  11 
(1) Lot Computer HW/SW & 
Furniture $498,782.00 $264,782.00 46.91% $234,000.00  9 
(300) ea 3KW Diesel Engines $450,000.00 $435,000.00 3.33% $15,000.00  4 
(160) ea 2KW Diesel Engines $264,000.00 $230,400.00 12.73% $33,600.00  4 
Desktop/Notebooks $241,500.00 $220,000.00 8.90% $21,500.00  12 
(295) ea 2KW Diesel Engines $501,500.00 $445,450.00 11.18% $56,050.00  4 
(270) ea 3KW Diesel Engines $405,000.00 $402,300.00 0.67% $2,700.00  4 
(1) Lot RF Tray Assembly $1,675,000.00 $1,025,000.00 38.81% $650,000.00  3 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $76,850.00 $38,100.00 50.42% $38,750.00  9 
(1) Lot Integrated Computer 
System $50,950.00 $50,500.00 0.88% $450.00  6 
(1) Lot Patriot Missile Spares $1,115,000.00 $1,102,500.00 1.12% $12,500.00  2 
(1) Lot Battery Housing 
Assembly $2,000,000.00 $1,280,000.00 36.00% $720,000.00  5 
(1) Lot Transformer Assembly $406,000.00 $384,500.00 5.30% $21,500.00  2 
(1) Lot Locking Devise $20,925.00 $19,725.00 5.73% $1,200.00  3 
(1) Lot NTDR Cables $88,000.00 $60,100.00 31.70% $27,900.00  2 
(1) Lot Mounting Brackets $500,000.00 $280,000.00 44.00% $220,000.00  5 
(200) ea 2KW Diesel Engine $360,000.00 $294,000.00 18.33% $66,000.00  4 
(200) ea 3KW Diesel Engine $340,000.00 $319,000.00 6.18% $21,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Monitors $395,800.00 $395,800.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(1) Lot Telephone Line Jacks $1,929,350.00 $1,524,097.00 21.00% $405,253.00  3 
(500) ea Desktop Computers $700,000.00 $605,000.00 13.57% $95,000.00  4 
(48) ea Laptop Computers $105,600.00 $71,520.00 32.27% $34,080.00  4 
(1) Lot Enhanced Power 
Adapter $1,920,000.00 $1,790,000.00 6.77% $130,000.00  4 
(1) Lot TA312 Telephone  $139,000.00 $113,200.00 18.56% $25,800.00  4 
(1) Lot Bracket Assembly $145,000.00 $90,000.00 37.93% $55,000.00  5 
(1) Lot Desktops/Notebooks $392,000.00 $335,000.00 14.54% $57,000.00  12 
(1) Lot Desktops/Notebooks $1,053,000.00 $825,000.00 21.65% $228,000.00  12 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $120,000.00 $48,750.00 59.38% $71,250.00  5 
(1) Lot J10077 Distribution 
Box $864,000.00 $310,000.00 64.12% $554,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $2,815,000.00 $310,000.00 88.99%
$2,505,000.0
0  9 





00  3 
(1) Lot Spares for 
Countermeasure $4,000,000.00 $3,999,999.00 0.00% $1.00  2 
(1) Lot M-172 Boom 
Microphone $503,000.00 $319,000.00 36.58% $184,000.00  3 
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(1) Lot Mechanical Scanners $250,000.00 $249,500.00 0.20% $500.00  2 
(1) Lot Telephone Circuit 
Trunk Jack $307,000.00 $140,800.00 54.14% $166,200.00  3 
(1) Lot TA-1/PT Telephone 
Set $1,631,708.00 $1,070,000.00 34.42% $561,708.00  2 
(1) Lot Circuit Card Assembly $285,500.00 $172,000.00 39.75% $113,500.00  4 
(1) Lot Radio Set Control 
Assembly $2,450,000.00 $2,450,000.00 0.00% $0.00  3 
(1) Lot PL1408 Circuit Card 
Assembly $1,925,000.00 $1,199,000.00 37.71% $726,000.00  16 
(1) Lot PL1403 Circuit Card 
Assembly $1,800,000.00 $689,000.00 61.72%
$1,111,000.0
0  15 
(1) Lot Signal Scanner $420,000.00 $270,000.00 35.71% $150,000.00  3 
(1) Lot NVD CID Tape $857,500.00 $500,500.00 41.63% $357,000.00  2 
(108) ea 2 KW Diesel Engine $183,600.00 $160,920.00 12.35% $22,680.00  2 
(1) Lot Patriot Spares $572,000.00 $572,000.00 0.00% $0.00  2 
(166) ea 3 KW Diesel Engine $282,200.00 $272,240.00 3.53% $9,960.00  2 
(1) Lot Electrical Arrester $500,000.00 $402,800.00 19.44% $97,200.00  5 
(1) Lot M175A, Microphone 
Capacitor $1,520,000.00 $1,190,000.00 21.71% $330,000.00  2 
(1) Lot Building 603 
Warehouse $1,250,000.00 $1,250,000.00 0.00% $0.00  8 
(115) ea 2KW Diesel Engines $195,500.00 $171,350.00 12.35% $24,150.00  2 
(1) Lot Feed-horn Assembly $250,000.00 $193,700.00 22.52% $56,300.00  4 
(1) Lot Desktop/Notebooks $1,633,000.00 $1,360,000.00 16.72% $273,000.00  17 
(1) Lot Bldg 907 Warehouse $700,000.00 $697,000.00 0.43% $3,000.00  5 
(204) ea 3 KW Diesel 
Engines $357,000.00 $334,560.00 6.29% $22,440.00  2 
(1) Lot Power Supply $2,902,000.00 $2,138,000.00 26.33% $764,000.00  7 
(1) Lot J10077 Distribution 
Box $564,000.00 $469,000.00 16.84% $95,000.00  7 
(1) Lot Motor, Alternating $100,000.00 $77,000.00 23.00% $23,000.00  2 
(1) Lot Power Supply Repair $33,000.00 $5,000.00 84.85% $28,000.00  7 
(1) Lot Power Supply   $107,000.00 $47,000.00 56.07% $60,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Digital Topographical 
Spt Equip $410,000.00 $405,500.00 1.10% $4,500.00  3 
(1) Lot Telephone Sets $3,311,000.00 $2,686,000.00 18.88% $625,000.00  5 
(115) ea Diesel Engines $189,750.00 $171,350.00 9.70% $18,400.00  2 
(451) ea Diesel Engines $789,250.00 $739,640.00 6.29% $49,610.00  2 





0  4 
(1) Lot Cable Assemblies, 
CX-13404 $70,000.00 $49,000.00 30.00% $21,000.00  6 
(1) Lot AN/ARN-98B Amplifier $335,400.00 $173,400.00 48.30% $162,000.00  8 
(1) Lot Amplifier Mixer 
Module $687,000.00 $479,000.00 30.28% $208,000.00  8 
(1) Lot CISCO Computer 
Equip Repair $6,200,000.00 $5,740,000.00 7.42% $460,000.00  9 
(1) Lot Fuel Pumps $390,000.00 $330,000.00 15.38% $60,000.00  3 
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(1) Lot Amplifier Mixer 
Module $119,000.00 $94,000.00 21.01% $25,000.00  4 
(1) Lot Radiators, 10KW 
Generator Set $520,000.00 $495,000.00 4.81% $25,000.00  5 
(1) Lot Alternator/Engine—
Electrical $1,850,000.00 $780,000.00 57.84%
$1,070,000.0
0  4 
(1) Lot Telephone Cable 
Assembly $2,850,000.00 $1,214,100.00 57.40%
$1,635,900.0
0  18 
(1) Lot SU-121/UA Optical 
Imagers $801,500.00 $800,500.00 0.12% $1,000.00  4 
(1) Lot TK-17/G Tool Kit $4,562,000.00 $4,405,000.00 3.44% $157,000.00  6 
(1) Lot Alternating Current 
Motors $184,800.00 $149,800.00 18.94% $35,000.00  2 
(1) Lot John Deere Engine 
Starters $300,000.00 $200,000.00 33.33% $100,000.00  2 
Grounding Kits $1,100,000.00 $896,000.00 18.55% $204,000.00  8 
Antenna to Antenna Base 
Adapter $14,000.00 $14,000.00 0.00% $0.00  3 
Post Amplifier Control Driver $2,700,000.00 $630,000.00 76.67%
$2,070,000.0
0  9 
Distribution Boxes $60,200.00 $49,800.00 17.28% $10,400.00  3 
Tool Kit 105 A/G $9,048,109.00 $4,913,109.00 45.70%
$4,135,000.0
0  4 
      
      
      
TOTALS:     31.62%
$48,651,681.
69   
Reproduced from Brown and Ray (2007, Appendix B) 
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